

**THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MEDIA IN MOBILIZING SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: A CASE
STUDY OF THE “SAVE THE ARCTIC” CAMPAIGN**

by

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Abstract

Social media plays a vital role in mobilizing social movement actors to produce and respond to a variety of issues. The development of the Internet and social media has transformed traditional social movements and provided a new means for people in modern societies to mobilize. While social media presents contemporary social movements with new opportunities, they also bring challenges. This study examines the “Save The Arctic” campaign launched by Greenpeace as a typical case of contemporary movements to explore how environmental movements intertwine with social networking platforms. Qualitative textual analysis of campaign-related content on Twitter is used to analyze who plays a role in mobilizing the campaign, what discourses social movement actors produce, and how activists use Twitter to promote campaign-related messages. The findings of this study provide insights into the changing relationship between social movement organizations and digitally networked individuals, how protest strategies shift through social media activism, how visual communication is used as part of social movement framing in digital forms of mobilization, and how the media environment for social movements shifts in the social media era.

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Chapter One: Introduction

The development of the Internet and social media has provided a new means for people to participate in controversial social discussions. In recent years, social media has played a significant role in mobilizing and organizing political and social protests worldwide, such as the Arab Spring and Occupy Wall Street (Browning, 2013; Castells, 2015; Vatikiotis, 2016). The adoption of new information and communication technologies by social movement actors has been predicted to transform traditional forms of political participation (Donk, 2004). It is argued that social movement organizations are losing their importance in mobilization (Castelles, 2015). Social media platforms, as a new set of communication tools, allow widely-dispersed individuals to connect and work together in a coordinated fashion, while also broadcasting their views and activities at home and abroad (Browning, 2013). The abilities of the Internet and social media in increasing the capacity of social movements to raise substantive issues and mobilize supporters has been documented (Stoddart & MacDonald, 2011; Earl & Kimport, 2011). In other words, social media plays a vital role in mobilizing social movement actors to produce and respond to a variety of issues. As with many social movements, environmental movements have also become intertwined with social media. Environmentalists increasingly employ online networks and social media to mobilize activists to communicate and take action on issues, such as climate change (Staggenborg & Ramos, 2016).

In order to explore the interaction of social media and contemporary environmental movements, I examine the “Save the Arctic” campaign on Twitter as a case study in my research project. The “Save the Arctic” campaign was launched by Greenpeace in 2012 principally to protect the Arctic from oil drilling, and it received a large amount of attention worldwide. Greenpeace was established in Vancouver in 1971 and has now become the largest and best-

know environmental organization in the world (Doyle, 2003). Greenpeace¹ is also a media-driven organization and has a long-standing history of creating its actions for the media (Doyle, 2003). To gain insights into the relationship of social networking platforms and environmental movements, I examine the “Boycott Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign and the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign as two critical events in the “Save the Arctic” campaign which were mobilized on Twitter. In particular, I provide insights into how Twitter was used by particularly interested and engaged members of the public to respond to, generate and engage in the mobilization of the “Boycott Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign and the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign. I use qualitative textual analysis to analyze campaign-related content on Twitter. The contribution of this research is to gain a better understanding of how social media is used by social movement actors to discuss and shape environmental issues.

Research Problem

My research answers the following question: What is the role of Twitter in social movements mobilization in the “Save the Arctic” campaign? Specifically, I ask: What unique qualities does social media, such as Twitter, bring to social movements? Does social media present new opportunities for social movements to disseminate and circulate messages? Are there limitations or concerns about the use of social networking platforms recognized by the research?

I also examine other significant related questions:

1. Who played a role in mobilizing the “Save the Arctic” campaign on Twitter?

¹ Readers who have interest in looking at Greenpeace’s media-oriented political strategy can consult: Doyle, A. (2003). *Arresting images: Crime and policing in front of the television camera*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

2. What kind of discourses were used to mobilize around oil conflicts on Twitter during the “Save the Arctic” campaign, and how did the Twitter content shape the campaign? In other words, I examine how written and visual content was circulated by activists on Twitter in order to “identify injustices, attribute blame, propose solutions, and motivate collective action” (Staggenborg & Ramos, 2016, p. 25).
3. How was Twitter used by activists to extend and promote campaign-related messages in the “Save the Arctic” campaign?

This research project enriches the existing academic research in how social media is used by social movements to address environmental issues. Specifically, the study provides insights into how social media shifts protest culture, including what social media strategies activists use to protest, and what new opportunities and limitations social media presents for social movements.

The Oil Controversy in the Arctic

The Arctic plays a significant role in influencing the world’s climate, ecosystems and human activities (Wright, 2014). The Arctic also contains a number of animals, plants, and human communities, including Inuit communities who have lived in the Arctic for thousands of years (Wright, 2014). Ecological changes in the Arctic do not only threaten local nature and human communities, but they also have global impacts on climate change, weather patterns, sea levels, fisheries, shipping and tourism, and so on (Dodds, 2010; Cunsolo Willox, 2012; Wright, 2014).

In the recent decades, the melting ice in the Arctic has become a growing concern because what occurs as Arctic and Antarctic ice melts shapes the broader climate of the Earth

(Dodds, 2010; Wright, 2014). Polar ice in both the northern and southern hemispheres plays a vital role in stabilizing Earth's average temperature and maintaining a comfortable environment to sustain life (Wright, 2014). The reduction of polar ice is accelerating global warming (Wright, 2014). The primary culprit of the melting of Arctic and Antarctic ice sheets is increasing global temperatures (Dodds, 2010; Wright, 2014). Rising global temperatures are caused by the release of invisible greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and water vapour (Wright, 2014). These gases are a major driver of global climate change (Dodds, 2010; Wright, 2014). The burning of fossil fuels (coals, oil, and natural gas) is a critical factor that results in the increase of the concentration of these greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, as suggested by the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment's report on *Impacts of a Warming Arctic* (2004).

Climate change has not only caused many negative impacts on weather patterns, wildlife, vegetation, water and food quality, and access and availability of land, but it has also brought many risks to human health and well-being (Cunsolo Willox et al., 2012). Indigenous people, frequently neglected in global discourses, have been experiencing these consequences (Cunsolo Willox, 2012). This reality eventually results in alterations to their cultures, livelihoods, and land-based activities (Cunsolo Willox, 2012).

While oil production and consumption are a primary source of environmental pollution and climate change (Sinclair, 2011), oil exploration has become one of the main constituents in the economic structure of coastal regions, bringing economic benefits to many countries (Carter, 2007; Wright, 2014). The energy potential of the Arctic zone is sufficiently significant to be of interest to the five Arctic coastal states (Canada, Denmark/Greenland, Norway, Russia and the United States), Nationalized Oil Companies (NOC), such as ROSNEFT, and Independent Oil Companies (IOC), such as Shell and BP (Dodds, 2010). For instance, Greenland authorities

awarded 13 exploration licenses to oil and gas companies, including Shell, Nunaoil, Conoco Phillips and Cairn Energy, and the government expected that there would be 20 wells drilled off the coast over the next decade (Shadian, 2014). The great interest of these northern communities and oil corporations in oil drilling comes from revenue streams and employment opportunities that are created by oil and gas (Dodds, 2010). Due to approximately 20% of the world's remaining undiscovered oil and gas resources being located in the Arctic and the increased accessibility of fossil fuel reserves caused by shrinking Arctic ice, government officials and oil industries are exploring the opportunity to exploit oil and gas as well as other resources in the new Arctic fields (European Parliament, 2008; Wright, 2014).

However, environmental security has been widely recognized and environmental destruction has been considered to be a threat to “soft power” security (Shadian, 2014). Soft power relies on the capacity of preferences of others (Lovric, 2016). Unlike hard power, such as military or economic forces, soft power is the ability of one country to attract other countries to admire its values or expect to seek its level of prosperity (Lovric, 2016). In other words, a country's attitude to conservation has become an important factor that influences whether or not the country can receive respect from others. In response to the climate change crisis, international environmental collaboration is required in the Arctic (Shadian, 2014). Policy-makers and organizations from World Wildlife Fund (WWF) to European Union (EU) have started demanding better Arctic governance to save the region from environmental devastation (Shadian, 2014). The Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), a transnational organization, was founded to develop a comprehensive environmental policy for protecting the Arctic environment (Shadian, 2014). ICC assembled international efforts by launching a petition in 2005 to combat climate change and the violations of the Inuit's human rights caused by global warming.

As can be seen from this analysis, oil conflicts have become one of the main environmental concerns in contemporary societies, and the Arctic has drawn particularly attention from international environmental movements as a site of contention over oil development. The “Save the Arctic” campaign was organized to arouse people’s awareness of severe environmental changes in the Arctic and to motivate people to protect the Arctic.

Thesis Outline

This thesis consists of five chapters. Following this first introductory chapter, in Chapter Two, I provide a contextual overview of the history of digital activism, as well as literature that directs the theoretical approach employed in this research. This chapter mainly focuses on ideas related to the changing relationship between social movement organizations and networked individuals in the social media age, the employment of framing theories in transnational activist networks through social media technologies, and the shifting media landscape of the social media era. This chapter provides the theoretical context for my study of the dynamics of social media activism through the case of the “Save the Arctic” campaign.

In Chapter Three, I explain the methodological approach used to address my research problems. This chapter provides detailed information about my sampling strategies and the qualitative textual analysis of the Twitter content relevant to the “Boycott Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign and the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign as two critical events within the broader “Save the Arctic” campaign.

In Chapter Four, I provide an analysis of my research data about each campaign. I examine both critical events from three dimensions: social actors, campaign targets, and the social use of Twitter. In terms of social actors, I look at who played a role in mobilizing both

campaigns and how social movement actors were intertwined with Twitter. Regarding campaign targets, I examine those who were framed as the targets of claim-making and mobilization in both campaigns on Twitter. Then, I use framing theories to examine how the targeted issues were interpreted and mobilized on Twitter. Finally, I discuss the social use of Twitter. I analyze how activists used the tactic of link sharing on Twitter to interact with other platforms in order to enrich and promote campaign-related messages.

In the final chapter, I synthesize the findings of the two critical events by teasing out their similarities and differences. This chapter contributes insights into the role of social media in mobilization around environmental issues by offering a critical discussion of the uses of Twitter around the issue of Arctic oil drilling in the “Save the Arctic” campaign. I also outline the limitations of my research project and suggest areas for future research.

Chapter Two: Literature Review

In this chapter, I provide an overview of the literature that examines the way social media changes the dynamics of social movements through the evolution of digital activism. I begin with a section on the historical context explaining key events that happened in different stages of digital activism. This helps explain how the Internet and social media technologies play a key role in mobilizing contemporary social movements. Then, I discuss the contemporary media landscape of repertoires of communication in which social movement actors mobilize social movements, and how this media environment changes relationships between social movement organizations and digitally networked individuals. Finally, I illustrate what strategies are employed to shape social movements and to mobilize movement audiences and targets. I also explore how effective the role of social media is in mobilizing social movements.

Social Media and Social Movements

Since the early 21st century, social networking sites have greatly transformed traditional social movements and become increasingly prominent within contemporary social movements. Social movement actors traditionally mobilize social issues through mass media, such as print and broadcast media, but they increasingly give more importance to new information and communications technologies, such as social media platforms (Earl & Kimport, 2011).

Going beyond a one-way process of information sharing provided by mass media (e.g. newspaper, radio, television), social media emphasizes a collaborative and participative two-way dialogue between a variety of content creators and audiences (Stoddart & MacDonald, 2011). The traditional ways of communication between mass media and the general public indicates the relationship of mass media and the public is asymmetric because media audiences rarely have the

opportunity to offer feedback to media producers (Lasswell, 1971; Stoddart & MacDonald, 2011; Mattoni, 2012). It means mass media as information senders have more control over the communication flow than media audiences as information receivers (Mattoni, 2012). However, the contemporary communication flow is generated through the interaction of diverse individuals (Mattoni, 2012). This communication mode based on the Internet and social media technologies highlights a mutual communication that is accomplished between senders and receivers. In other words, the general public potentially now have more influence over the communication flow than before.

The implementation of new communication and media technologies in social movements has a long history (Vatikiotis, 2016). In 1994, the Zapatista movement launched by Indigenous people in Mexico against the Mexican government played a vital role in demanding an expansion of Indigenous rights and recognition from the local government and the world (Godelmann, 2014). The Zapatista uprising in Mexico is widely recognized as the prototype of transnational activism where internet technologies play an important role in diffusing the messages of Indigenous people to global audiences (Schulz, 2014; Vatikiotis, 2016). In 1999, another transnational protest, the Anti-WTO Demonstration, unfolded in Seattle. Protestors criticized the WTO's policies and transmitted the information to the world with the use of cell phones, irc-chats, online forum and other Internet technologies (Karatzogianni, 2015). After the disastrous terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in New York on September 11, 2001 and leading up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, a series of anti-war activities against the Iraq war began to emerge across the world. Internet technologies helped mobilize a coalition of ten million people to engage in the peace movement and quickly form a globally connected movement against the war

(Karatzogianni, 2015). E-mail lists, group text messages, chat rooms, the blogging and other Internet-based techniques were used by anti-war groups to organize the movement.

In the next few years, more protests were coordinated to fight for global justice and democratic political systems (Karatzogianni, 2015; Vatikiotis, 2016). In 2004, the Ukrainian Orange Revolution was launched by a large number of people to protest against fraud in the presidential election with the employment of mobile phones and the Internet (Vatikiotis, 2016). In 2008, a variety of protests against the financial crisis emerged in Iceland (Vatikiotis, 2016). The Internet helped disseminate the information to the world and accelerate the mobilization of global audiences in response to the Icelandic government performance (Vatikiotis, 2016). In the meantime, Barack Obama recognized the value of social networking technologies and won the US presidential election with the aid of social media activism (Karatzogianni, 2015). In 2011, the Arab Spring uprisings spread out and the protestors used social media to stay networked and organized (Castells, 2015; Vatikiotis, 2016). During the Arab Spring revolutions, Twitter played a central role in disseminating the protesting information to individuals across Arabic regions and unifying them to boycott the old authoritarian regimes and demand new democratic political changes (Castells, 2015; Vatikiotis, 2016). At the same time, the outcry against social and economic inequality was widely spread on Twitter and people in the U.S. launched Occupy Wall Street movement in response to their outrage. The hashtag #occupywallstreet was then distributed and circulated by the networked activists on the Internet. Twitter played an essential role in mobilizing individuals by providing a real-time network to promote their communication (Castells, 2015). According to Karatzogianni (2015), other digital activism related to feminist, LGBT and environmental movements also started coming to public attention after 2011.

In the last decades, protest culture has shifted from traditional social movements that rely on physical co-presence and centralized organizations to contemporary social movements which benefit from participatory networks of individuals and the construction of collective identities established by the Internet and social media technologies.

Repertoires of Communication

Since 1990s, the emergence of information and communication technologies, such as social networking platforms, has transformed the mainstream-dominant mass media system to a multifaceted media environment for social movements (Mattoni, 2012). A variety of media technologies are available for social movement actors to mobilize contemporary social movements (Mattoni, 2013).

Before the Internet and social media technologies become prevalent, mainstream mass media play a central role as gatekeeper between citizens and political actors in mobilizing around social issues (Mattoni, 2012). For instance, Greenpeace always stresses the significance of media coverage in its political strategy, and the group makes strategic use of mass media in movements (Carroll & Ratner, 1999). Despite the commitment to drawing mass media attention to mobilization, a few difficulties hinder activists to devise tactics that operate within the norms of mass media (Carroll & Ratner, 1999; Mattoni, 2012). First, the opinions of mainstream mass media on social movements are usually negative (Mattoni, 2012). On one hand, mainstream mass media is considered to be biased towards social movements because it is largely controlled by institutional political actors who can benefit from denying their association with contentious issues mobilized by activists (Mattoni, 2012; Castells, 2015). For instance, mainstream media in Italy has strong roots in literature and politics in which many journalists stress more on

expressing their opinions than reporting facts (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). On the other hand, the news-making process in mainstream mass media leads to misleading representations of these issues (Mattoni, 2012; Staggenborg & Ramos, 2016). In other words, the limited amount of time or space in mainstream media outlets and the eager of journalists to attract audiences with big stories cause a lack of real understanding of protest events and overshadow some aspects of protests that activists consider to be much more important (Mattoni, 2012). As such, the relationship between social movements and mass media is considered to be a relationship of asymmetrical dependency (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993; Carroll & Ratner, 1999). In other words, social movements usually need media coverage for exposure more than mass media need to cover movements for news reportage (Staggenborg & Ramos, 2016). The media lies at the center of a mass communications network, and this brings media a wide range of options for news reportage (Carroll & Ratner, 1999; Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993). However, social movements had few communication channels but mass media for spreading their messages to audiences before the prospering of social media (Carroll & Ratner, 1999; Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993). As a result, proliferating social movement organizations and social issues were competing for limited media space (Dauvergne & Neville, 2011).

Despite the difficulties of gaining mass media attention for movements, activists continue to consider mainstream media as important and seek media coverage (Corrigall-Brown, 2016; Staggenborg & Ramos, 2016). This is perhaps because media attention can help legitimize a movement's cause and enhance exposure for contentious issues of concern to the general public (Stoddart & MacDonald, 2011; Seguin, 2016; Corrigall-Brown, 2016; Staggenborg & Ramos, 2016). This helps activists reach a much larger and diverse audience, which is beyond movement organizations' own outreach ability, and also helps engage counter-movement actors and

governments in public debate (Stoddart & MacDonald, 2011; Seguin, 2016; Corrigan-Brown, 2016; Staggenborg & Ramos, 2016).

Due to the difficulties of drawing mass media attention to social movements, social movement actors turn to social media and organizational websites to mobilize. Social media challenges the dominant influence of mass media. Readers do not only receive mainstream media messages, but they also have the access to other viewers' comments as recommendations which potentially enhance their support for mass media's views or disqualify the persuasive effects of mass media content (Neubaum & Krämer, 2017; Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955). In other words, the Internet and social media offer audiences greater independence to process and evaluate the information from mass media.

Social networking sites and organizational websites offer potential for social movements to speak directly to the general public across the globe (Donk, 2004; Earl & Kimport, 2011). The Internet and social media provide individuals with communication power to become their own publishers and broadcasters (Rainie & Wellman, 2012; Mattoni, 2012). Web 2.0 technologies (i.e. unmediated interactive social media) empower individuals with autonomous capacity to circumvent the control of governments and corporations in communication and to articulate discourses and mobilize activities around social issues, which weakens the dominant influence of mainstream mass media and promotes self-representations in social movements (Earl & Kimport, 2011; Uldam & Askani, 2013; Castells, 2015; Ceron & Memoli, 2016). On one hand, the Internet and social media provide the general public with opportunities to frame their own demands (Staggenborg & Ramos, 2016). For instance, activists initiated the Idle No More movement through a Facebook thread and organized flash mobs by using Twitter handles in the movement (Staggenborg & Ramos, 2016). In other words, social media offers tools for activists to present

their own movement messages and promote individual engagement in mobilization. Also, websites of environmental organizations generally present a broader scope of environmental issues and offer more detailed discussion of their issues than mass media (Stoddart & MacDonald, 2011; Stoddart, Ramos, & Tindall, 2015).

In addition, the Internet and social media offer individuals access to a greater variety of information and more extended audiences with less cost in time and money (Earl & Kimport, 2011; Rainie & Wellman, 2012). On one hand, information now becomes extensively accessible and abundant on social media and it is always within reach (Serres, 2014). The Internet and social media technologies foster a continuous circulation of information updates within the media network (Rodgers & Scobie, 2015). These technologies also help activists diffuse their messages more quickly, which makes it more difficult for the government to block (Earl & Kimport, 2011). In other words, activists can use social media to keep audiences constantly informed of the progress of their mobilization and comments from audiences, which enables activists to mobilize social movements more effectively. For example, electronic mail, mailing lists, websites, electronic forums and other online applications provide powerful tools for coordinating activities among geographically dispersed individuals (Donk, 2004). These tools allow activists to access and participate in quick and easy online collective action with low risk and low cost, such as signing online petitions and email campaigns, which can help social movements recruit potential participants (Earl & Kimport, 2011). As such, the Internet and social media enable people to afford to absorb the costs of participation, so that they are more likely to participate in social movements (Earl & Kimport, 2011).

On the other hand, the interactive Web 2.0 environment provides numerous opportunities for individuals to explore and develop new relationships, even among the most remote strangers

(Rainie & Wellman, 2012). The Internet and social media break the limitation of geographic distance and link social movement actors to each other across great distances (Rodgers & Scobie, 2015). Social media allows individuals to maintain contacts with weaker ties, such as neighbours and coworkers who are actually considered to be critical sources of information and support (Rainie & Wellman, 2012). When information is broadcast outside of personal relationship circuits, it can also draw public attention to salient social issues within their communities (Rodgers & Scobie, 2015). In other words, social media enables interactive and self-configurable communication among widely-dispersed individuals (Castells, 2015), and allows them to connect and work together in a coordinated fashion (Browning, 2013). As a result, the Internet and social media enable people to potentially function better in a complex environment (Earl & Kimport, 2011; Rainie & Wellman, 2012).

Despite the benefits of being cheap, accessible, interactive and delocalized, the Internet and social media are more likely to reach like-minded audiences who already have sympathy towards the conflict rather than the public who mainly receive messages about social movements from mass media (Wilhelm, 2000; Bennett & Iyengar, 2008; Corrigall-Brown, 2016). Therefore, the Internet and social media have the advantage of activating existing support, rather than persuading larger audiences (Lee & Chan 2013; Lee, 2015).

As discussed in this section, social movements operate within a more complex and multifaceted media environment, or repertoires of communication (Mattoni, 2013). The repertoire of communication is defined as the set of relational media practices which stress the interaction of social movement actors and a series of communicative resources, such as media technologies, media outlets and media professionals (Mattoni, 2013). For example, content created by authors on websites, such as online news articles, and user-generated content, such as

comments made by readers on news articles, are both being seen on social media platforms (Walther & Jang, 2012; Neubaum & Krämer, 2017). The concept of repertoires of communication implies that the use of social media has not replaced the use of mass media in contemporary social movements. Instead, social media helps create a more complex and multifaced media landscape for movements to navigate and make use of. In other words, a convergence of mainstream media coverage and interactive communication has been widely witnessed on social media platforms.

Social Movement Organizations and Networked Individuals

Unlike most traditional social movements, modern social movements, such as the Arab Spring and Occupy Wall Street movements, do not “recognize any leadership and reject all formal organizations”, and they also no longer need organizations to organize collective action (Castells, 2015, p. 4; see also Earl & Schussman, 2003; Benkler, 2006; Shirky, 2008). The concept of formal leadership refers to traditional “rational” or “personalized” leadership and “vertical authority” (Castells, 2015, p. 181). This is because that the Internet and social media have greatly reduced the cost of creating, organizing and participating in protests, which breaks the barriers to collective action and makes it possible for individuals to mobilize (Shirky, 2008; Earl & Kimport, 2011). In other words, the mobilization and coordination of contemporary social movements can rely on the capacity of a networked society facilitated by the Internet and social media technologies (Castells, 2015). This digitally networked society witnesses a process in which “the revolutionary change from small groups to broader personal networks has been powerfully advanced by the widespread use of the Internet and mobile phones” (Rainie & Wellman, 2012, p. 8). The new social networking system is called networked individualism in

which “people function more as connected individuals and less as embedded group members” (Rainie & Wellman, 2012, p. 12). Networked individuals are empowered by the Internet and social media because these technologies allow them to access and collect a variety of information, explore and build new connections with individuals who share common interest or face similar experiences, assess different advice and options in the decision-making process, and voice their own opinions (Rainie & Wellman, 2012). In other words, social media usage is considered to be able to decentralize the leadership of social movement organizations and endow individuals with more autonomy and equality to mobilize social movements (Castells, 2015). Social media has spurred a demand for new forms of participatory planning and self-organizing governance by individual audiences (Kleinhans, Van Ham, & Evans-Cowley, 2015).

However, apparently spontaneous and leaderless movements can actually be organized by artificial grassroots organizations that are sponsored or created by corporations and governments (Cho, Martens, Kim, & Rodrigue, 2011; Greenberg, Knight, & Westersund, 2011; Wear, 2014). This activity is defined by researchers as “astroturfing” in which third parties disguise their involvement as spontaneous and natural grassroots to either support or disagree with certain beliefs or perspectives in order to manipulate political discourses and deceive audiences (Cho et al., 2011; Greenberg et al., 2011; Wear, 2014). Cho et al. (2011) noted an example of astroturfing activities in their research that an alleged large-scale campaign creating and funding “think tanks” to disseminate false information about global warming and climate change science was actually sponsored by ExxonMobile Corporation. Not only governments and corporations but also social movement organizations increasingly use public relation tactics and rely on corporate communication consultants to influence key audiences and policy-makers (Dimitrov, 2008). It is difficult to distinguish effective astroturfing organizations from genuine

grassroots organizations, especially in the age of the Internet and social media (Wear, 2014). The use of a wide range of software makes it possible for a few people to produce the illusion of a large number of people participating in digital activism (Wear, 2014). The emergence of astroturfing activities has definitely challenged the idea of spontaneous and self-managed mobilization and urged social movement researchers to rethink who are the leaderless coalitions of networked individuals in the context of the digital media sphere.

Contemporary social movements lay stress on the power of network individualism, but absolute autonomy and leaderless participation do not seem realistic (Gramsci, Hoare & Smith, 1971). In fact, so-called spontaneous and leaderless social movements are highly organized (Gerbaudo, 2012). These contemporary social movements are mediated by various communication technologies, and this is developing types of “soft, indirect, and invisible or ‘choreographic’ forms of leadership” (Gerbaudo, 2012, p. 163). The leaders or organizers in the movement are essentially those participants who devote lots of effort to the movement (Gerbaudo, 2012). Gerbaudo (2012) suggested that social actors should not neglect “inequalities and asymmetries” embedded in mobilization where “there are people who lead and people who follow” (p. 165).

Despite claims about leaderless social movements, many researchers still argue that social movement organizations remain important to social movements (Gerhards & Rucht 1992; Earl & Kimport, 2011; Mercea, 2012). Social movements can succeed and endure partly because they encompass various organizational structures and capacity for devising strategies and tactics (Staggenborg & Ramos, 2016). For example, more centralized and formalized organizations commonly use institutionalized tactics, such as legislative lobbying, while decentralized and informal structures tend to conduct direct action (Gerlach & Hine, 1970; Freeman, 1975;

Staggenborg & Ramos, 2016). Social movement organizations do not only encourage audiences to take action by providing them with incentives, such as offering free rewards in exchange of a donation, but also play a critical role in creating favourable opportunities in which individuals can collectively protest and participate in decision-making processes (Klandermans, 2004; Earl & Kimport, 2011; Staggenborg & Ramos, 2016). Especially in terms of high-risk action, social movement organizations can bring a degree of commitment and trust to movement participants that cannot be produced by self-mobilized individuals (Mercea, 2012). As a result, social movement organizations, such as Greenpeace, become important spokespersons and signalling agencies in a movement (Snow & Benford, 1988; Holzer, 2010; Earl & Kimport, 2011). In other words, social movement organizations can transform individual decisions into public statements, which allows personal choices to influence and alter the behaviour of governments and corporations (Holzer, 2010).

Social movement organizations can work to mobilize and activate each other (Earl & Kimport, 2011), and this process is also known as the process of mesomobilization (Morris, 1984; Gerhards & Rucht 1992). Social media does not change the nature of how people decide to participate in social movements (Horton, 2004; Bennett, 2003a, 2003b, 2004a, 2004b). Rather, social media helps activists become more informed and connected while promoting the engagement of protest actors in the movements (Horton, 2004; Bennett, 2003a, 2003b, 2004a, 2004b). In other words, social media can help social movement organizations work better and achieve further goals in mobilization (Earl & Kimport, 2011). Social media enables social movement organizations to connect with each other more easily, and these umbrella organizations help scope and plan the enlargement of their protests through their connections (Bennett, 2003a, 2003b, 2004a, 2004b; Earl & Kimport, 2011).

The use of social media to mobilize may give the impression that social movement organizations are no longer needed. However, this is not the case. Social movement organizations are irreplaceable because they play an important role in mobilizing social movements (Earl & Kimport, 2011; Castells, 2015; Staggenborg & Ramos, 2016). Networked individuals and social movement organizations are not mutually exclusive in mobilization. Instead, they are interconnected and can accomplish a better result as a whole in social movements.

Framing Theory and Transnational Advocacy Network Strategies

The way social movement actors frame issues in public discourses plays a central role in mobilizing social movements. Framing strategies do not only have an impact on the amount of exposure social movement issues are able to receive from mainstream mass media, but also influence audiences' perspectives of these issues.

Framing is the process of social movement organizations "constructing and defining events for an audience through the control of agenda and vocabulary" (Rohlinger, 2002, p. 480; see also Goffman, 1974; Benford & Snow, 2000). When conducting this process, organizers simplify and condense aspects of life space in ways that can inspire and legitimate action of social movement organizations in order to perform interpretation of what is at issue (Snow & Benford, 1988; Benford & Snow, 2000; Rohlinger, 2002). In other words, by communicating action-oriented beliefs and meanings that guide action, frames are used "to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists" (Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 198; see also Benford & Snow, 2000). Movement organizers make use of frames in the movement to present audiences with core issues, pressure relevant parties to take

responsibility for problems, suggest possible solutions for problems, and motivate individuals to take action (Benford & Snow, 2000; Gamson, 1992).

In order to recruit potential participants to join in social movements, social movement organizations need to frame issues based on “frame alignment”, which is the connection between the ways individuals and social movement organizations interpret things (Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986). Snow and his colleagues (1986) suggested four types of frame alignment: frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame transformation. They believed any of these processes is significant to the mobilization of social issues, and these four processes help achieve movement goals by interacting with each other.

Frame bridging is the process that is employed by social movement organizations to align with individuals who share the same grievances and beliefs about certain issues but have a deficiency of organized strategies to pursue their goals (Snow et al., 1986). In order to effectuate this bridging, organizations disseminate their messages through interpersonal or intergroup networks, traditional technologies, such as the mass media, the telephone and the mail, and contemporary computer-based technologies (Snow et al., 1986).

Frame amplification is the process of “the clarification and invigoration of an interpretive frame that bears on a particular issue, problem, or sets of events” (Snow et al., 1986, p. 469). This process is designed for organizations to promote values or beliefs that may not be salient or evident to potential adherents or to change indifferent and uncertain attitudes towards an issue (Snow et al., 1986). Frame amplification includes two varieties: value amplification and belief amplification (Snow et al., 1986). Values refer to the goals that social movements consider to be worthy of promotion and protection (Snow et al., 1986). One example of value amplification is embodied in the peace movement. In this movement, basic values such as justice, perseverance

and the sanctity of human life were frequently focused, while idealized values of the movement was associated with equality and liberty (Snow et al., 1986). In order to amplify these values, activists firmly stated their democratic rights to participate in the debate about the nuclear arms race, national security, and foreign policy (Snow et al., 1986). In terms of beliefs, they can be understood as ideas that support or hinder action that movements mobilize to pursue desired values (Snow et al., 1986). In order to accomplish movement goals, it is important to elevate and reinvigorate discourses on beliefs about how severe an issue or grievance is, the focus of a conflict, stereotypic beliefs about antagonists, beliefs about the efficacy of collective action, and beliefs about the necessity of taking action on the issue (Snow et al., 1986). One example of the amplification and transformation of stereotypic beliefs about antagonists can be found in the movement in which activists opposed the relocation plan of the Salvation Army shelter for homeless people (Snow et al., 1986). Activists transformed a stereotypically positive impression of the Salvation Army to a negative impression by amplifying and underlining the historical association of transients with the Salvation Army, thereby presenting them as a threat to neighborhoods. In terms of promoting beliefs about the efficacy of collective action, movement leaders in the peace movement frequently used the successes and achievement of past movements to encourage audiences to become optimistic about the outcome of the action (Snow et al., 1986).

Frame extension is the process in which social movement organizations extend existing interpretive frames for the purpose of encompassing interests or views that may not be embedded in extant social movement actors and enabling these values or beliefs to resonate with a broader public (Snow et al., 1986). By doing so, movement leaders attempt to enlarge the movement's adherent base and attract potential supporters to mobilize (Snow et al., 1986). For instance,

movement leaders in the peace movement used rock-and-roll and punk bands in order to include interests that were not apparently related to the movement and to attract uninterested individuals to participate in protests (Snow et al., 1986).

Frame transformation is required when the values or beliefs promoted by social movement organizations may not relate to – or may even violate – the public’s interests or rituals. In this case, a transformation of frames is required. New values need to be exploited and conventional understandings need to be modified (Snow et al., 1986). Frame transformation is an important strategy for social movement organizations, such as Greenpeace, to mobilize transnational corporations by combining “morality and the market” in political consumerism (Smith, 1990; Holzer, 2010). By offering a framework that explains to consumers what public consequences are likely incurred by their individual consumption behaviors, activists can persuade consumers to change their shopping decision as a method to express their concern about social and environmental problems, which exerts moral pressure on corporations to alter their behaviour as their responsibility for nature and people (Holzer, 2010).

In social movement studies, framing theory has been employed to focus on the analysis of text instead of images, and visual analysis has been mostly neglected by social science researchers (Daphi, Lê, & Ullrich, 2013). However, visual analysis provides social movement researchers and readers with insights into “framing processes and the dynamic of political diffusion inside and outside movements and in increasingly globalized yet culturally diverse societies” (Doerr, Mattoni, & Teune, 2013, p. xxii). Visual analysis also helps researchers understand how images offer social movement actors symbolic resources to evoke audiences’ resonance with the related movement discourses (Doerr et al., 2013).

Images are considered to be influential tools of mobilization, and occasionally, the power of images in subverting the sovereign control in a country and transforming political practices plays a key role in mobilizing protests (Doerr et al., 2013). Images are the products generated by the way protest actors perceive the issues mobilized in social movements, and these images will further influence how audiences understands the movements. Images also allow social movements to gain more visibility in the public. On one hand, the employment of a variety of images draws attention from a broader public today than in the past. On the other hand, offline activities mobilized by protestors are being seen more and more by audiences with the aid of social media today than in the past (Doerr et al., 2013). Online platforms, such as YouTube, offer activists relatively effortless ways to document protests and diffuse protest information through images, and therefore play an essential role in helping protestors circumventing the gatekeepers of mainstream mass media (Askanius, 2013).

Other than diffusing movement information, images, as well as texts, also have the capacity of recruiting potential adherents through mobilizing the individual's emotion with moral leverage. The concept of morality, known as "moral shocks", tends to occur when "an event or situation raises such a sense of outrage in people that they become inclined towards political action" (Jasper & Poulsen, 1995, P. 498). The transformation of emotion to action is the process in which a social movement bursts (Castells, 2015). In order to accomplish this transition, individuals need to overcome their anxiety and concern for protest action by expressing anger and outrage (Castells, 2015). As a result, this process will bring individuals hope to pursue their goals in mobilization (Castells, 2015). In other words, invoking protest actors' outrage is critical to motivate social movements. As such, injustice

frames are employed by social movement organizations interpreting “what is happening” when “an authority system is violating the shared moral principles of the participants” in order to mobilize the outrage of social movement actors (Gamson, Fireman, & Rytina, 1982, p. 123).

Activists sometimes create visual injustice symbols to generate moral shocks by providing photographic evidence of injustice connected to existing injustice frames in order to recruit concerned people to social movements (Jasper & Poulsen, 1995; Olesen, 2013). Images are able to act as “a public utterance” that arouses cultural and emotional resonance with audiences when they are associated with sets of meanings in the real world (Olesen, 2013, p. 8). Moral shocks are commonly employed by social movement actors to resonate with audiences in transnational environmental movements (Holzer, 2010; Dauvergne & Neville, 2011). For instance, Greenpeace frequently uses emotional language and images in campaigns in order to convince people that some practices and choices are morally and environmentally wrong (Dauvergne & Neville, 2011).

Framing is a prominent task in addressing transnational problems (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Holzer, 2010; Staggenborg & Ramos, 2016). In order to bring local or domestic issues to international attention, transnational advocacy networks employ the boomerang effect strategy to shape issues in transnational activism. “The boomerang effect” is used by transnational advocacy networks to help “amplify local demands by resituating them in different arenas with more potential allies” (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p. 144). This “boomerang pattern of influence characteristic of transnational networks may occur” when communication channels between the nation and its domestic citizens are blocked or disrupted by the country’s sovereign power (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p. 12). Activists in local movements in the Global South originally used this

strategy to attract the resources and political power from the Global North in order to exert international pressure on their domestic governments in the Global South (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Stoddart, Smith & Tindall, 2016). By doing so, transnational activists hoped to bring changes to local issues, mostly in less developed countries (Holzer, 2010). However, Stoddart and his colleagues argued that the boomerang effect no longer fits this model (Stoddart et al., 2016). The boomerang effect is now also used by social movements in the Global North to single out and pressure governments in the Global North (Stoddart et al., 2016). This new mode was demonstrated in the COP 15 protests in which Canadian environmental movements used international arenas to generate pressure on the Canadian government for its poor performance on climate change (Stoddart et al., 2016).

As another strategy to shape transnational issues, social movement organizations often seek out the opportunity to cooperate with celebrities. Due to the limited access to resources and the cost of advertising, social movement organizations tend to turn to “free media” as the solution to their situation (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). On one hand, celebrities are able to draw media attention to environmental causes and reach out to a broader audience with their symbolic authority as spokespeople (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993; Meyer & Gamson, 1995; Brockington, 2009; Ellcessor, 2018). As such, celebrities can help mobilize environmental movements by lending their fame to conservation objectives (Brockington, 2008). This encourages social movement organizations to create their opportunities with celebrities in order to ask them to advertise for movements (Rohlinger, 2002). However, how celebrities say about movements is a more important factor that affects social movement organizations to decide who are liable to cooperate with (Brockington, 2009). There are a few factors that can explain the prevalent tendency of celebrity activism: the mobilization of the United Nations, the promotion of Non-

governmental organizations, the freedom given to celebrities to manage their own activities, and global issues keeping celebrities popular (Brockington, 2008; Tsaliki, Frangonikolopoulos, & Huliaras, 2011). Celebrities play an effective role in enhancing the public's interests in global issues and can solicit a good amount of support from audiences (Tsaliki, Frangonikolopoulos, & Huliaras, 2011). On the other hand, some celebrities rely on their attitude or stance towards environmental issues to build their prestige (Brockington, 2008). In digital activism, celebrities' social media accounts are seen as influential hubs communicating information and values to audiences (Elcessor, 2018). However, celebrities are also confronted with challenges from social media platforms in online activism because these platforms can easily expose their personalities and make it possible for audiences to directly contact them (Elcessor, 2012). Therefore, how celebrities decide to get involved in social movements on social media is directly related to whether or not they can achieve their fame and popularity.

Offline and Online Activism: Opportunities or Challenges?

Earl and Kimport (2011) categorized the web-related activism in the modern society into three different types based on their levels of leveraging of the affordances of the Internet: e-movements, e-mobilization and e-tactics. E-movements are movements that “emerge and thrive online” and entirely unfold online (Earl & Kimport, 2011, p. 233). E-mobilizations are defined as the activism in which activists employ online tools to organize offline protest action (Earl & Kimport, 2011). E-tactics consist of a variety of protest action with different degrees of offline and online components where at least part of activists' participation occurs online, such as online petitions, boycotts, and letter-writing campaigns (Earl & Kimport, 2011). As such, online activism does not only rely on the Internet and social media, but it is also intertwined with offline

activities. It is the combination of offline and online collective action that successfully creates social changes (Castells, 2015).

Castells (2015) argued that it is necessary for social movements to exploit a public space which is “not limited to the Internet but makes itself visible in the places of social life” (p. 10). Offline occupied spaces create a community of togetherness that helps activists overcome fear and become dedicated to mobilizing social movements. By participating in offline activities, individuals “defy the bureaucratic norms of the use of space” and “trespass the boundaries set up by the dominant elites” (Castells, 2015, p. 10). Occupying offline spaces symbolizes “the power of invading sites of state power or financial institutions” in order to demand the rights of citizens that have been taken away by the political institutions (Castells, 2015, p. 10). In addition, offline activities can be crucial because they assist activists in the circulation and canvassing of campaign messages to isolated places that are beyond the reach of digital technologies (Castells, 2015). Moreover, offline action helps social movements become successful because they can create visceral connections (Davis, 2011). Offline activists can meet in real groups and share their thoughts and ideas freely, which allows their passion to spread like a virus (Davis, 2011).

Online action consists of a step on a ladder of engagement to promote offline engagement (Schumann & Klein, 2015). Online action may “foster subsequent—possibly more involving—participation offline owing to an increased sense of empowerment or driven by accomplishment and action-oriented emotions” (Schumann & Klein, 2015, p. 310). In other words, individuals can develop confidence in their abilities of mobilizing when participating in collective action, which results in a growing sense of engagement and willingness to participate in future action (Drury & Reicher, 2005; Drury, Cocking, Beale, Hanson, & Rapley, 2005). In addition, the Internet and social media can be used as an instrument to increase transparency and

accountability in social movements (della Porta, 2013). For example, Distaso and Bortree (2012) argued that social media is considered to be a platform for open dialogues with publics that facilitate interaction and raise unexpected topics that help strengthen the relationship between organizations and audiences. Some scholars also illustrated the potential of the Internet for building trust and constructing collective identities online, which can be turned into mobilization and participation offline (Nip, 2004; Hara, 2008; Wojcieszak, 2009). Furthermore, social networks on the Internet provide activists with opportunities to communicate and amplify their offline experience, and to create autonomous spaces to debate and plan out their offline protest strategies (Castells, 2015).

Both digital social networks and offline support communities are tools for self-reflection and a statement of people's power (Castells, 2015). "The internet and wireless communication networks" and "the space of places of the occupied sites and of symbolic buildings targeted by protest action" constitute "the space of autonomy" which lies at the center of social movements (Castells, 2015, p. 250). Activists create this public space of autonomy to escape the authority of the state and mobilize contentious issues through self-management and solidarity, and this novel use of public space can attract mainstream mass media to report on issues and protest action (Castells, 2015).

However, the mobilizing potential of the Internet and social media has also been called into question. Previous research showed that quick and easy online collective action, such as "liking" Facebook pages or signing online petitions, may foreclose meaningful engagement (Kristofferson, White, & Peloza, 2014). Because movement participants possibly feel that their online action already produce a positive influence on audiences, they are less willing to engage in further offline action for the same cause (Kristofferson et al., 2014). In addition, low-cost and

low-risk digital practices, known as clicktivism or slacktivism, are also considered to be in danger of being too fast, too thin and too many (Bromberg, 2013; Lim, 2013; Schumann & Klein, 2015). While many clicks may be witnessed online, they are just “little sticks”, which means that “there are very few causes that make for widespread activism in the vast online social media environment” (Lim, 2013, p. 653-654). In other words, individuals who simply engage in online action may not bring about measurable social changes.

On the other hand, the proliferation of social media amplifies the challenges of surveillance and containment (Uldam, 2016). Social media provides governments and corporations with new possibilities to monitor social movements and censor dissent as a potential risk that menaces national security under control of governments or reputations of corporations (Bennett, 2003; Costanza-Chock, 2004; Curran, Fenton, & Freedman, 2012; Uldam, 2016). In order to accomplish law enforcement or other political purposes, governments supervise and acquire personal data through cooperating with private internet service providers and social media providers (DeNardis, 2014). In terms of corporations, they employ big data collected from social media to identify issues and events that can potentially harm their reputations, which helps corporations regain control of exposing their own activities (Andrejevic, 2014; Uldam, 2016). Corporations, such as Shell, often choose not to respond to critiques in order to potentially avoid getting into more trouble (Uldam, 2016). In addition, the strategy of silencing critics, such as taking down campaign websites in the name of maintaining brand reputation, is also adopted by corporations (Uldam, 2016). The surveillance and control of disagreement from governments and corporations largely hinders the potential of social media to mobilize counter-hegemonic discourses, which causes “unequal power relations that privilege government and corporate elites” (Uldam, 2016, p. 204; see also Curran et al., 2012).

Conclusion

Recent literature on topics, such as digitally networked individualism, repertoires of communication and on/off-line action, described important qualities of social media that are changing ways activists participate in social movements. Specifically, the literature on social movements and digital media examined how the proliferation of social media transforms the relationship of networked individuals and social movement organizations in social movements. This helps shape my research problem of who played a role as social movement actors to produce and respond to issues in the “Save the Arctic” campaign. In addition, the literature on framing theories and the concept of repertoires of communication helps guide my examination of media content in order to explore what protest messages were disseminated and how these messages were communicated to audiences through the use of social media in the movement. The framing analysis of my data provides insights into how protest strategies, such as the use of the boomerang effect and the tactics of on/off-line action, were shifting through social media activism in the movement. Moreover, previous literature helps me contribute insights into how different forms of communication were used to disseminate protest messages in the movement, especially the use of visual communication as part of social movement framing in digital forms of mobilization. Finally, previous literature helps me explain how social media intertwined with mass media in the “Save the Arctic” campaign.

Chapter Three: Research Methods

In this chapter, I provide an overview of the research methods for my study of how social actors mobilized the “Save the Arctic” campaign with the aid of social networking sites. I discuss qualitative web-based textual analysis as the approach that guided me to collect, generate and analyze my data. Specifically, I describe my sampling strategy, and explain why I chose Twitter as the platform for data collection and how I selected two critical events happening during the “Save the Arctic” campaign as prototypes to illustrate the way this environmental movement was organized and unfolded. I interpret Twitter content by using NVIVO to categorize the data into a variety of themes and to conduct matrices to explore the interconnections among themes.

Research Design

In order to examine how social media is employed by social movement actors to mobilize environmental movements, I conducted a qualitative case study by looking at how the “Save the Arctic” campaign was mobilized on Twitter. I chose to look at two critical events: the event of boycotting the Lego-Shell partnership and the event of “Free the Arctic 30”. These two critical events were selected because they received a large amount of response from social movement actors and involved a variety of movement tactics that are worth looking at. Some scholars argued that a case study is considered to be insufficient for perceiving social life as a whole (Hamel, Dufour & Fortin, 1993). This is because the scope of the study is only relevant to one case, and one case only provides readers with limited perception of social issues (Hamel et al., 1993). However, the case study is also considered to be an “in-depth investigation” because it employs different methods to collect a variety of information and make observations based on a great number of empirical materials. In addition, the scope of the case study includes “a review

of problems and considerations previously discussed regarding the representativeness of cases investigated” (Hamel et al., 1993, p. 35). Moreover, the case study is considered to be a crucial element in the process of expanding and generalizing theories (Hamel et al., 1993). Through conducting studies of a series of selected cases, researchers are able to generate and optimize a general explanation based on a set of results and apply it to enrich some theories (Hamel et al., 1993).

Due to the limitations of time and resources, I was not able to explore every moment of the “Save the Arctic” campaign. Therefore, I decided to use a purposive sampling strategy to select textual data for my research. A purposive sampling strategy is commonly used when researchers intend to gain in-depth insights into “a specific setting or phenomenon” (Sharp et al., 2012, p. 38). Because of my research goals, using this method can guide me to find the best cases possible in order to understand the “Save the Arctic” campaign.

My findings produced with the aid of the case study method and purposive sampling method may not be all applicable to explaining other environmental movements (Hamel et al., 1993; Sharp et al., 2012). However, they can raise questions, contribute new perspectives on social movement theories, and create an opening for other researchers to continue further research in other social issues including environmental issues mobilized in the social media age.

In terms of conducting my data collection and analysis, I adopted a qualitative research method of textual analysis to collect and analyze discourses related to Arctic oil drilling. I first employed a qualitative method of textual analysis to collect data from Twitter. Then, I organized my data by designing a coding scheme and coding the data into different themes in NVIVO. When I analyzed the data, I used NVIVO matrix queries to examine the in-depth meaning of each theme, and the correlation between different themes and emerging themes.

Data Collection Strategy

I conducted my data collection by building up an archive of the Twitter content related to the “Save the Arctic” campaign including written text and visual materials generated by social movement actors through keyword and hashtag searching. The content from Twitter can be analyzed to provide readers with insights into how individuals and social groups used social media in response to Arctic oil conflict, and how social media discourses and strategies in the mobilization work in dialogue with counter-claims from movement opponents.

According to Fairclough (2003), discourses consist of words and images through which people represent aspects of the processes, relations and structures of the material world, the mental world of thoughts, feelings, beliefs, and the social world. Since particular aspects of the world may be represented differently, it is necessary for us to consider the relationship between different discourses. Social media provides important platforms for people to spread their messages and communicate their thoughts. Texts and images on social media are different forms of discourses that people frequently use to present the world. Discourses can also be used for individuals and organizations to relate and interact with each other. Therefore, I examine not only different forms of discourses individually, but also their interaction and relationship. Fairclough (2003) also argued that discourses do not only represent the world as it is, but it is also projective. This means that they are imagery, representing possible worlds which are different from the actual world, and are tied in to projects to change the world in particular directions (Fairclough, 2003). Therefore, the role of social media in mobilizing the discussion on Arctic oil controversies can be examined through social media content analysis.

Sampling Discourse

Among all the social media platforms, I decided to choose Twitter as the main source of my data collection. Twitter is one of the most popular social media technologies in the world (Marwick, 2013). As of the second quarter of 2018, monthly active users on Twitter averaged at 335 million people (*Number of monthly active Twitter users worldwide*, n.d.). Twitter empowers social media users to disseminate their own messages and also to respond to the information shared by other audiences to an extensive degree (Tupper, 2014). Twitter allows for “instant postings of photos, on-the-ground reports, and quick replies to other users” due to the easy access of tweet information (Marwick, 2013, p. 94). The constraint of 140-character* tweets requires users to create concise messages concisely and proficiently in order to adapt their language use to the microblogging service (Coesemans & De Cock, 2017). In other words, audiences need to make strategic use of Twitter in order to reach their targets effectively in a concise and quick manner. As such, examining Twitter content permits me to identify the online strategies that social movement actors used to mobilize Arctic oil conflict.

Also, Twitter hashtags can help users track trending events which shows the main interest of the public or the issues which have been popularly discussed (Tupper, 2014). News agencies, politicians, activists and celebrities are the groups who employ Twitter more frequently in order to raise awareness of local and global issues, ideas and noteworthy news stories (Marwick, 2013; Tupper, 2014). In this case, Twitter is a useful source to explore and find the critical and popular events that receive response from a variety of sources in the “Save the Arctic” campaign.

Moreover, Twitter has two main features: retweet and @reply. Retweeting can be understood both as a form of diffusing information and as a mean of engaging in a conversation

* The limit of characters for tweets was expanded on Nov. 7, 2017, but the data collection for my research had been completed before then.

(Boyd, Golder & Lotan, 2010). Users who spread tweets do not only intend to get messages out to new audiences, but also to validate and engage with others (Boyd et al., 2010). This implies that Twitter users will not find it worthwhile to share the content unless the original message is funny, clever and useful (Marwick, 2013). Coesemans and De Cock (2017) believed that the more a tweet post is retweeted by Twitter users, the more this post will be exposed in the public. This means these posts are more likely to be noticed and followed on Twitter (Coesemans & De Cock, 2017). In terms of @reply, it is a feature designed for Twitter users to draw attention to their messages from other users, such as people with plenty of followers. In the meantime, they also expect people who are tagged in their Twitter posts will respond to their messages (Marwick, 2013). By looking at these features of Twitter, I am able to exploit how social networking technologies transform the traditional mobilization of social issues by promoting the interaction of social actors.

The “Save the Arctic” campaign rose in 2012 and the movement lasted for almost three years. Although the movement has subsided, there are still feelings of resentment in the community, and people are still expressing their concerns for the Arctic. There is a large amount of data about the theme of “Save the Arctic” since the campaign started. Given limited time and resources, however, the most feasible way to gather data for my study was to collect information about critical periods of mobilization by protest actors, which can help us understand the overall dynamics of the whole campaign. Thus, I decided to use a purposive sampling strategy to discover the most feasible sample size.

Purposive sampling requires me to select data based on my professional knowledge or other scholars’ previous research, and it also allows me to adjust or change my samples at any time while I proceed with my research (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Suen, Huang & Lee, 2014).

Therefore, I first broadened the scope of potentially meaningful data by searching for various keywords or hashtags. These keywords or hashtags are “#savethearctic”, “Arctic Shell oil”, “Arctic oil drilling Greenpeace”, “#ShellNo”, “Arctic oilrigs”, “Arctic climate change”, “Arctic fossil fuels”, “offshore oil Shell”, and “Greenpeace Statoil”. Also, the feature of “Twitter Advanced Search” was used to limit the sampling frame. This was achieved by limiting the search results to English content only and created in the period of 2012 to 2015.

Based on the search results, I then decided to specifically analyze two influential events to which campaigners responded very actively: the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign and the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign. Critical events are what social movement actors frequently use to construct campaigns in order to draw public attention to targeted issues (Ramos, 2008). These two events are representative of the whole “Save the Arctic” campaign and worth being compared for several reasons. Both events unfolded internationally and received a large amount of response from international audiences. They involved a variety of protest tactics employed by social movement organizations and networked individuals. They shared similarities in the ideology of environmental movements led by Greenpeace, but also had difference showing how different strategies were highlighted under different circumstances. In terms of the differences between the two events, they had different targets against which they protested. The main targets of the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign were the Lego and Shell corporations, but the main target of the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign was the Russian government. Also, the “Boycott the Lego-Shell partnership” campaign involved the interests of a broader public while the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign primarily targeted the political sphere of a few countries.

In order to fully examine these two campaigns, I pursued more information about the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign by using the keywords and hashtag “Lego #savethearctic” to search for relevant tweets created from July 2014 to October 2014, and obtained more information about the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign by using the hashtag “#freethearctic30” to collect relevant data produced from September 2013 to November 2013. The periods of time which I gathered data from are also the time when the events mainly occurred. The corresponding Twitter content was captured and archived from Twitter in PDF format, and all the PDF documents were downloaded and imported into NVIVO qualitative data analysis computer software.

Due to the large amount of content on the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign on Twitter, I decided to examine this event by sampling 10% of the total data that I collected. Specifically, I sampled this event by looking at every tenth tweets on the PDF documents. As a result, I analyzed 834 tweets for the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign and 3,241 tweets for the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign. This sample was sufficient to reach data saturation. Data saturation occurs when “no new data or relevant information emerges with respect to newly constructed theory” (Saumure & Given, 2008, p. 196). By the end of coding this sample, the addition of new data and coding did not substantially change my coding categories (Tracy, 2012).

In addition to looking at the texts and visual content on Twitter, I also examined the links to mass media and social movement organization websites that were shared on Twitter. This helped in exploring how mass media and social movement organization websites were incorporated into social media platforms to help mobilize the campaign. The “Save the Arctic” campaign gained lots of attention and coverage from mass media, such as newspapers and

radio/TV stations, and Arctic oil drilling conflict was also discussed on organizational websites, including Greenpeace and World Wildlife Fund.

Data Generation and Analysis

In order to provide critical insights into the “Save the Arctic” campaign, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) was used to explore the texts produced and posted on this topic. The analysis method employs Fairclough’s three-dimensional model which involves analysis of the text, discursive practice and socio-cultural practice (Fairclough, 1993). Janks (1997, p. 329) provided more detailed explanation for these three dimensions. They include:

- 1. the object of analysis (including verbal, visual or verbal and visual texts);*
- 2. the processes by which the object is produced and received (writing/speaking/designing and reading/listening/viewing) by human subjects;*
- 3. the socio-historical conditions that govern these processes.*

Considering Janks’s summarization of Fairclough’s model, the first step of my analysis is to identify the themes in online discussion (Small & Harris, 2014). Ryan and Bernard (2003, p. 85) argued that identifying themes involves several tasks:

(1) discovering themes and subthemes, (2) winnowing themes to a manageable few (i.e., deciding which themes are important in any project), (3) building hierarchies of themes or code books, and (4) linking themes into theoretical models.

Ryan and Bernard (2003) explained that themes do not come only from the data but also from the investigator’s prior theoretical understanding of the phenomenon being studied. Referring to the relevant research can provide readers with a clear understanding of the dynamic of environmental movements, and it also offers me an opportunity to tell readers what I can

contribute to the existing research. By following Ryan and Bernard's process for content analysis, I first defined a preliminary coding scheme inspired by the literature review in order to outline and direct my coding structure. For example, I created nodes of "content producers (i.e. social movement organizations)" and "content targets" based on social movement theories. I created nodes of "text content themes" and "visual communication" respectively by referring to the research in visual analysis of social movements. I created nodes of "link sharing (of mass media and organizational websites)" because of the discussion in social movements literature about the relationship of mass media, organizational websites and social media. Then, I adopted a semi-structured method to complement my coding scheme, which offered me the opportunity to vary my coding scheme with emerging themes from my observation of the data. In order to best examine my research problems, I compared the coding themes with my research problems, selected or consolidated the most important and valuable codes, and eliminated those which are tangential to my research problems until no new significant themes emerged (Silverman & Marvasti, 2008). My final coding scheme (see Appendix One) has six leading nodes, and they encompass topics on content producers, movement targets, the themes of written and visual materials, link sharing strategies and social use of retweets.

In terms of data analysis, I used NVIVO software to conduct qualitative textual analysis. An advantage of using the NVIVO program is this software enables the data to become more dynamic. This means that NVIVO makes relationships between categories more visible by using text formatting and hyperlinks to other documents and categories (Weaver & Atkinson, 1994). I did manual coding for my data because this offered me the opportunity to interpret the data and make the decision on what to code. With the assistance of NVIVO, I did not only conduct an in-depth analysis of every single node under each category to examine how discourses were

articulated in each campaign, but also used discourse network analysis to examine ties that connected the same node from one category to different nodes from other categories. A discourse network generates coding matrices in NVIVO that quantify thematic coding and provides the frequency of themes co-occurring in Web 2.0 content (Stoddart & Nezhadhossein, 2016). This approach highlights the role of network analysis as a significant supplement for a qualitative research design (Hesse-Biber, 2010). When I was conducting the visual discourse analysis² of the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign and “Free the Arctic 30” campaign, I particularly explored how diverse visual materials intertwine with “the mobilization, framing, diffusion, and resonance” of the campaigns (Doerr, Mattoni, & Teune, 2013, p. xii). Specifically, I addressed two aspects of research in the visual analysis of social movements: the visual expressions of social movements, such as visual symbols and activists’ visual appearances, and the visibility for social movements, such as the online diffusion of offline narrative (Doerr, Mattoni, & Teune, 2013).

Methodological Reflexivity

The qualitative textual analysis method is an unobtrusive method of observation for web content. The pragmatic benefit of this method is that Internet-based data collection is cost-free. Since Twitter content was available to the public and easy to access, I was able to acquire the relevant research information without spending time and money in traveling and did not feel concerned about confidentiality issues. These benefits offered me flexibility in conducting research (Macnamara, 2005). Another benefit of textual analysis was that it allowed me to work

² Reader who have interest in looking at the visual culture of social movements can consult: Mirzoeff, N. (1998). *The visual culture reader*. London; New York: Routledge.

with data from a more extensive period than interactive-oriented methods. Hine (2005) argued that Internet research has connotations of topicality. In other words, discourses on the Internet provided me with updated information and kept me aware of the mobility of information. Thus, I was able to see the evolution of discourses through time and to identify popular discourses, which allowed me to gain a good understanding of a full-scale development of the “Save the Arctic” campaign.

Textual data has the benefit of not being influenced by research context because it is not generated by researchers. However, the problem of inference is embedded in textual analysis (Cottle, 2003). This problem describes when analysts do not have data from either content producers or audience members who could shed more insights into the social dynamics of content production and reception, they have to make inferences about the intended meaning or audience reception of textual content simply based on the text itself. In other words, my interpretations of the data were considered in the analysis process. According to McKee (2003), the ways in which members of different cultures make sense of a text may vary based on the way in which they understand the world around them. This means that different people interpret texts from different angles. Therefore, I might not have an accurate grasp of all the information circulated by social movement organizations or networked individuals by simply using textual analysis techniques. However, I was well aware of the issue which might appear in the process of interpretation, so I ensured caution in making assertions about the information related to the “Save the Arctic” campaign. I also provided a context for the Twitter data I collected in order to improve the validity of my interpretations, which was necessary and significant (McKee, 2003). In terms of my case study of the “Save the Arctic” campaign, the content was understood and interpreted based on the context of Arctic oil conflict.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I described the qualitative research method for my case study on how Twitter was employed by social movement organizations and networked individuals to mobilize the “Save the Arctic” campaign. I adopted a qualitative textual analysis of PDF files downloaded from Twitter to generate data. I discussed purposive sampling as the strategy directing me to select Twitter as my research location and to determine the events of “Boycott Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign and the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign as my research objects. I explained the coding steps as my data generation strategy. I also described the data analysis technique of using NVIVO qualitative computer software to gain insights into my samples by developing the matrices of discursive coding themes. Moreover, I justified the contribution of qualitative textual analysis and purposive sampling to my research project, but I also analyzed the limitations of both strategies.

Chapter Four: Research Results

In this chapter, I explore how Twitter was used to mobilize both the “Boycott Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign and the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign. My results contribute in-depth insights into the new opportunities that social media, such as Twitter, offers activists to mobilize and the challenges that social media brings to protest culture. I first elaborate how Twitter influenced the relationship between social movement organizations and networked individuals in the campaigns. Then, I engage the concepts of frame alignment processes with the analysis of written and visual content on Twitter to explain what issues were targeted and how these targets were shaped by activists in the campaigns. I especially discuss what protest strategies, such as the boomerang effect, the celebrity effect and moral shocks, were employed by activists in the campaigns, and how these strategies were shifting through the use of Twitter. Finally, I examine the concept of repertoires of communication and contribute to the understandings of how activists used Twitter to promote their protest strategies and messages in the context of multifaceted media environment.

Critical Event One: the “Boycott Lego-Shell Partnership” Campaign

The “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign was launched by Greenpeace globally in order to target Lego for prioritizing its commercial interests by cooperating with oil giant Shell and neglecting its responsibility to the environment and the impact of its commercial decision on children’s futures (Greenpeace Urges Lego, 2014). To address the potential threat to the unique wildlife living in the Arctic and global climate caused by Shell’s Arctic oil drilling plan, Greenpeace was dedicated to pressuring Lego, the biggest global toy company, to cease producing toys with oil giant Shell’s branding (Greenpeace Urges Lego, 2014). In the next

section, I explain how the elements of campaign activities were mobilized with the aid of Twitter in the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign in order to contribute insights into how social media impacts the mobilization of environmental issues.

Social Movement Actors

In this section, I examine who played a role in mobilizing the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign.

As shown in my data, Twitter content was created by both individual and organizational accounts. Individual accounts were registered by users with their individual identities, through which users produced campaign-related content as individual participants. Organizational accounts were created by Greenpeace or other groups in order to convey information or opinions which represented the interests of a group of people. Individual accounts generated 78.02% of the total campaign-related content on Twitter, while organizational accounts produced 21.98% of the total content on Twitter.

Despite the fact that individual participants created a larger amount of campaign-related content, organizations still played an important role in mobilizing around the issue of the Lego-Shell partnership. This finding was explored by looking at the number of retweets. Retweeting is used by Twitter users to disseminate information and participate in a conversation (Boyd, Golder & Lotan, 2010). Twitter users are more likely to diffuse and reinforce tweets produced by other people when they find these tweets impressive and worth spreading (Marwick, 2013). Activists repost campaign-related information in the hope of increasing the exposure of the information and enabling the messages to reach out to a broader public (Coeseemans & De Cock, 2017). As such, the number of retweets is able to show what types of messages resonate with campaign

participants and other Twitter audiences. My data shows that tweets created by organizations had substantially more retweets than content produced by individual participants in general, and organizations were also at an advantage in terms of the average number of retweets that every tweet received. As such, the data indicates that organizational messages resonated much more frequently with Twitter audiences than individual messages. According to previous research, organizations are considered to be able to bring movement participants a good degree of commitment and trust in mobilization (Earl & Kimport, 2011; Mercea, 2012). Therefore, in the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign, organizations had more mobilizing capacity than individual participants.

This mobilizing capacity of movement organizations is embodied in creating protest opportunities for movement participants and using institutionalized tactics, as also suggested in previous research (Klandermans, 2004; Earl & Kimport, 2011; Staggenborg & Ramos, 2016). This finding can be seen by examining the content of organizational tweets that were retweeted in the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign. The retweets present two themes that were commonly seen in my data. On one hand, social movement organizations encouraged supporters to pressure Lego to end its partnership with Shell. For example, Greenpeace Bristol tweeted, “@Harbourfest Meet us at the Harbour Festival 19th-20th of July, Bristol Harbourside and help stop Lego working with Shell #SaveTheArctic.” Another example was tweeted by Greenpeace: “Love LEGO, hate Arctic drilling? Sign and RT >>> grnpc.org/Ig0I0 #BlockShell #SaveTheArctic.” On the other hand, the images of Lego toys were used to protest against Shell. For instance, Greenpeace USA tweeted, “The #LEGO gang delivered a clear message to @Lego_Group today to #BlockShell & #SaveTheArctic.” In order to pressure Lego to end its partnership with Shell, social movement organizations used the images of protesting Lego toys in

the name of “Lego protestors” or “Lego protest” to draw Lego’s attention to the conflict and also to express their grievances about Lego’s partnership with Shell.

Commonly retweeted content also includes points when environmental organizations created online petition websites for activists and encouraged them to sign the petition, and also coordinated offline action, such as physical gatherings and meetings. In addition, organizations devised a strategy to pressure Lego to stop its partnership with Shell by using the images of Lego toys, such as when activists wore Lego toy costumes or created virtual protests made of Lego toys on Twitter. As such, movement organizations did not only offer both online and offline protest opportunities, but also used certain online protest strategies and provided audiences with information about protest progress shared by their professional staff.

Despite the leading role of organizations, individual participants who were connected through digital social networks made it possible for the campaign-related information to widely proliferate and diversify. Twitter, as one of the commonly used social media platforms, informs audiences of the issue of the Lego-Shell partnership and the progress of the campaign internationally, and also helps coordinate widely-dispersed individuals from different locations to engage in the campaign (Earl & Kimport, 2011; Rainie & Wellman, 2012; Browning, 2013). As shown in my data, individual activists shared supportive information in different languages, such as English, Spanish, French, and offline protest activities were organized in different regions and countries. By using Twitter, individual participants proliferated campaign-related information and disseminated it to a broader audience in various parts of the world.

In addition, Twitter offered international audiences autonomy and communication power to engage in the discussion of the issue of the Lego-Shell partnership and become their own broadcasters (Castells, 2015). The autonomy of these voices enabled individual participants to

contribute different protest strategies and information to the mobilization. As can be seen in my data, individual participants showed their own protest activities on Twitter. For instance, individuals tweeted to show their participation in online petitions or tweeted photos of their own written protest messages. However, this participation with individual features was not produced by movement organizations. As such, individual participation increased the diversity of the discussion of the Lego-Shell partnership issue.

Based on the findings that I have discussed above, an evolving relationship of social movement organizations and networked individual participants in the era of social media can be seen in the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign. Different from previous research focusing on leaderless participation and dependence on digitally networked individuals (Earl & Schussman, 2003; Benkler, 2006; Shirky, 2008; Earl & Kimport, 2011; Castells, 2015), my findings suggest that digitally networked individuals do not replace social movement organizations. Social media has improved the mobilizing ability of individuals, but this does not deny the importance of social movement organizations in social movements. Instead, social media enables social movement organizations and digitally networked individuals to become interconnected and coordinated in mobilization to enlarge the scope of movements and enrich movement information.

However, the problem of authenticity in the role of networked individuals in producing and circulating campaign-related information is also embedded in my findings. Previous research showed the possibility of astroturfing activities involved in social movements in which artificial or fake activists are sponsored or created by corporations and governments to manipulate movement discourses (Cho et al., 2011; Greenberg, Knight, & Westersund, 2011; Wear, 2014). In my data, some individual protest activities were likely generated by astroturfing organizations

who constituted a third group in addition to social movement organizations and digitally networked individuals. In other words, astroturfing activities possibly challenged the role of networked individuals in mobilizing around the Lego-Shell partnership issue. Nevertheless, it is difficult and beyond my abilities to assess or evaluate which users were or were not manipulated by astroturfing organizations.

In addition to the findings of a changing relationship of social movement organizations and digitally networked individuals, my data also shows an evolving relationship of the leading social movement organization and other groups in a movement. In terms of the Twitter content generated by organizations, 90.91% of the content was created by Greenpeace organizations while 9.09% of the content was produced by other groups.

| Greenpeace Organizations | | Other Groups |
|--------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|
| Greenpeace | Greenpeace Pix | Mint Press News |
| Arctic Sunrise | Greenpeace Japan | Local Auckland |
| Greenpeace UK | Greenpeace USA | the Public Society |
| Greenpeace Canada | Greenpeace Huddersfield | March for Elephant |
| Greenpeace Newcastle | Greenpeace New Zealand | Team4Nature UK |
| Greenpeace Bristol | Greenpeace East Asia | Clean Ocean Energy |
| Greenpeace Aus Pac | Greenpeace Cherbourg | Wilderness Committee |
| Greenpeace Pictures | Greenpeace Edinburgh | Mid Island News |
| Save the Arctic | Greenpeace Southwark | Climate Issues |
| Greenpeace St. Olaf | Greenpeace Camden | Alaska Wilderness League |
| Greenpeace Oxford | Greenpeace UK Oceans | Protect All Wildlife |
| Greenpeace Shoreditch | Greenpeace Nottingham | Lucy Lawless Fan Club Team |

| | | |
|-----------------------------|------------------------|---|
| Greenpeace Southwest London | Greenpeace Philippines | Nature for Life Conservation Initiative |
| Greenpeace Waltham Forest | | |

Table 1 Organizational Accounts in the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” Campaign

As shown in Table 1, the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign received a wide range of responses from social movement organizations across the globe. Organizations in this campaign produced tweets in three common topics: encouraging audiences to protest, asking Lego to end their business with Shell, and informing the audience of ongoing online and offline action. The campaign-related content that different groups produced on Twitter appeared consistent. In other words, organizations seemed to have similar interest in circulating campaign-related information on Twitter.

As shown in my data, Greenpeace played a leading role in the mobilization and contributed the majority of the Twitter content discussing the issues of Lego’s partnership with Shell. However, other organizations also played a part in mobilizing protest activities and provided support to the campaign. As such, Greenpeace organizations including the head office and regional branches worked in solidarity with other organizations. This finding implies that the mobilization of issues related to Arctic oil drilling relied on the coordination of multiple groups rather than a single organization.

In addition, my data shows that regional Greenpeace groups, such as Greenpeace UK, Greenpeace USA, and Greenpeace Aus Pac, were the main constituents of social movement organizations in this campaign. Regional groups did not only organize activities in local

communities, but also used supportive slogans in local citizens' native languages. Because the impact of oil exploitation on climate change and human life had become a concern of global citizens (Wright, 2014), the "Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership" campaign against Arctic oil drilling was internationalized and localized. As such, the mobilization around issues related to Arctic oil drilling relied on a coalition of many regional branches rather than any head office.

These findings demonstrate the idea of "mesomobilization" discussed in previous research, arguing that social movement organizations have the capacity to mobilize other organizations and the goal is to achieve a greater scale of action (Gerhards & Rucht, 1992; Earl & Kimport, 2011). Twitter provided opportunities for Greenpeace and other social movement organizations, such as Team4Nature UK and Nature for Life Conservation Initiative, to easily connect and scale up the campaign through their connections (Bennett, 2003a, 2003b, 2004a, 2004b; Earl & Kimport, 2011). The quantity of movement organizations is helpful to mobilization. However, organizational abilities of resonating with activists with various cultural backgrounds cannot be neglected as well. It is suggested that scientific and moral frames of environmental issues resonate differently with audiences due to changing cultural and media contexts (Dauvergne & Neville, 2011). In other words, the same campaign-related discourses may be perceived differently by different audiences based on their cultural backgrounds. In order to recruit citizens across the globe to participate in the "Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership" campaign, Greenpeace attempted to mobilize many regional groups to connect to local citizens by communicating with local citizens in their native languages and organizing offline activities in local communities for people to gain a better understanding of the campaign. Therefore, my findings suggest that the "mesomobilization" of social movement organizations is not only about

the scope of coalition of different organizations, but also about the ability to respond to various cultural contexts in which individual activists are embedded.

Campaign Targets

In this section, I discuss who were framed as the targets of the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” mobilization on Twitter. Then, I use framing theories to examine how the issue was interpreted on Twitter.

As suggested in existing literature on framing theories, social movement organizations employ frames to help audiences understand issues they are experiencing (Goffman, 1974; Luhtakallio, 2013). By doing so, social movement organizations are able to present audiences with core issues, pressure relevant parties to take the responsibility to address the problems, suggest possible solutions for the problems, and recruit people to participate in collective action (Gamson, 1992; Benford & Snow, 2000). Therefore, it is necessary to conduct framing analysis of the written and visual content circulated by social movement organizations on Twitter in order to perceive what issue was targeted in the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign and how social movement organizations mobilized supporters to take action on the issue. Specifically, I use the concept of frame alignment processes to explain how social movement organizations associated their interpretation of the issue with activists through Twitter (Snow et al., 1986).

Within all the Twitter content I gathered that can be identified with a target, 52.22% of the content targeted Lego and 47.04% of the content targeted Shell. Lego and Shell were usually targeted at the same time by activists in the campaign. In terms of the Twitter content targeting Lego and Shell, directly calling for a termination of Lego and Shell’s cooperation was the most

commonly shared content on Twitter, which constituted 23.63% of the total content that I analyzed. Asking movement participants to take online and offline action to pressure Lego to stop its partnership with Shell was also a common theme, which accounted for 21.98% of the total tweets. Another noticeable theme was the visual use of Lego mini figures for protest, which represented 13.19% of the total tweets. Apart from these common themes, the following tweets were also frequently seen in my data: showing protest activities of individual participants against Lego's partnership with Shell in offline settings, presenting a large number of people engaging in online action, expressing grievances towards Lego's partnership with Shell, highlighting that Lego matters to children, accusing Shell and Lego of polluting kids' imagination, boycotting oil giants like Shell for their harmful pollution of the Arctic, complimenting and thanking Lego for stopping their partnership with Shell, showing protest action against the Lego-Shell partnership from celebrities, complimenting and thanking individual activists for taking action, and showing Lego ending its partnership with Shell.

In terms of the visual content on Twitter that I analyzed, the commonly circulated pictures showed Lego mini figures protesting against Shell, Lego mini figures celebrating the victory of the campaign, and posters of Lego toys and supportive words. Other widespread images presented children participating in campaign activities, supporters holding propaganda posters in offline protests, activists wearing Lego costumes, polar bears walking on the broken ice, intimate polar bears hugging each other, and scenes of oil spills. In addition, *Lego: Everything is Not Awesome* and *Lego, Help Children Save the Arctic* were the mostly circulated videos, which respectively constituted 42.31% of the total videos shared on Twitter by social movement organizations. Another video circulated by social movement organizations showed 50 kids building a toy polar bear with giant Lego bricks in front of Shell's office.

By analyzing the written and visual data, many tweets motivated audiences to engage in online or offline action or both types of activities. For example, Greenpeace wrote on July 16, 2014, “SIGN if you love @LEGO_Group and want to #blockShell from Arctic drilling. grnpc.org/Ig0Aw #SaveTheArctic.” In this tweet, Greenpeace encouraged movement participants to sign the online petition that was created by Greenpeace in order to pressure Lego to end its partnership with Shell. Another example of using online action to recruit potential supporters was created by Greenpeace UK, stating: “We've hit 1 MILLION people asking @LEGO_Group to dump Shell & #SaveTheArctic.” In this tweet, Greenpeace UK used numbers to show the great progress that the online campaign had achieved as of September 22, 2014, which could bring activists a sense of accomplishment. In terms of attracting potential supporters to engage in offline activities, Greenpeace Bristol tweeted on July 11, 2014, “@Harbourfest Meet us at the Harbour Festival 19th-20th of July, Bristol Harbourside and help stop Lego working with Shell #SaveTheArctic.” In this tweet, Greenpeace Bristol attempted to use Twitter to organize offline activities for activists. As shown in the data, Greenpeace and other groups provided protest opportunities on Twitter to individual activists to participate in.

This strategy can be explained using the idea of frame bridging process, in which social movement organizations attempt to recruit potential movement adherents by reaching out to these individuals through traditional or new media technologies (Snow et al., 1986). In the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign, movement organizations mobilized both online and offline protest activities that were available and easily accessible on Twitter, and this provided options for movement adherents to participate in the campaign. In addition, the analysis of retweeting in the last section shows that movement participants frequently resonated with the framing of online and offline action. These findings indicate that the use of Twitter in mobilizing

activists is a crucial form of frame bridging alignment (Snow et al., 1986), and it is an useful and effective strategy for movement organizations to use to recruit potential participants. In other words, Twitter served as an important platform to recruit potential movement supporters in the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign.

These findings also show that activists rely on both online and offline action in order to make social changes (Castells, 2015). In this campaign, online action consists of a stepping stone to promote offline engagement (Schumann & Klein, 2015). This is perhaps attributed to the mobilizing abilities of online action. Low-threshold online participation creates autonomous space for protestors to plan out their offline protest strategies (Castells, 2015). Online action can also create a sense of empowerment and accomplishment and help activists construct collective identities (Nip, 2004; Drury et al., 2005; Hara, 2008; Wojcieszak, 2009; Schumann & Klein, 2015). These action-oriented emotions can foster subsequent offline action (Schumann & Klein, 2015).

In order to inspire and facilitate individuals to engage in the campaign, Greenpeace and other organizations further explained and optimized their frames, which is known as frame amplification alignment (Snow et al., 1986). Illustrating the focus of contention is one of the core tasks in frame amplification process (Snow et al., 1986). In this campaign, the focus of the conflict was the Lego’s partnership with Shell.

As another task in frame amplification process, social movement organizations widely expressed grievances in order to show the Lego-Shell partnership was seriously opposed and the campaign was given great importance by activists (Snow et al., 1986). For example, Save The Arctic @savethearctic posted on Aug. 27, 2014, “As a huge #LEGO fan, I'm outraged you're helping #Shell clean up its image for dirty oil drilling #SaveLego #savethearctic.” Save the

Arctic group used the word “outraged” to show their grievances and objection to the Lego and Shell’s partnership.

In order to explain why it was necessary to take action on the issue (Snow et al., 1986), social movement organizations clarified that the Arctic environment was valuable and worthy of protection. They emphasized the potential threats of Shell’s oil drilling plan to the Arctic’s ecosystem and global climate, as well as negative impacts on the future of children caused by Lego. Specifically, social movement organizations diffused images depicting striking consequences of oil exploitation, such as melting ice, a polar bear’s lonely walking on broken and isolated ice, and a bird soaked in spilled oil, to indicate the potential threat of Shell’s oil drilling plan in the Arctic.

My data shows that the use of polar bear images was one of the main strategies for Greenpeace to mobilize their campaign. This is because that polar bears are considered to be endangered species by many environmental organizations that need to be saved (Martinez, 2014). Polar bears have been seen as the representative of the icy and snowy Arctic and also become an emotional symbol arousing individuals’ sympathy for the melting Arctic which suffers from climate change (Slocum, 2004). Another reason elaborated by social movement organizations for audiences to take action is that Lego’s support to Shell set a bad example in protecting the environment for children who are their main consumers. For instance, Save the Arctic @savethearctic wrote: “If LEGO cares about children's future, dump the oil company that destroys it #SaveLego #SaveTheArctic grnpc.org/gotweet” and “@LEGO_Group don't let @Shell pollute our children's minds! #BlockShell and #SaveTheArctic.” In these tweets, Save the Arctic indicated that Shell’s oil drilling plan can produce pollution, and this negative impact on its customers’ children would be brought by Lego cooperating with Shell.

Moreover, social movement organizations attempted to gain visibility for the campaign by extensively using images of protest scenes consisting of Lego toys. An example of an online action was that activists widely circulated pictures showing protest activities using Lego mini figures. In terms of offline action, Greenpeace USA posted “Just a life-size #LEGO dropping some knowledge on how @Lego_Group could #SavetheArctic from #Shell” and attached a photo of an offline protest scene. Previous research argued that activists often become marginalized because images that protestors use to articulate their goals are not familiar, expected or compatible with the general public’s experience (Doerr et al., 2013). In other words, in order to become better engaged in the movement, activists should circulate images that convey messages familiar and relevant to audiences’ experience. In the campaign, the images of Lego toys can resonate with audiences through their nostalgic feelings towards Lego, and the goal of protecting the Arctic from oil drilling communicated from the images was not strange to audiences as well. Thus, organizations circulated the images of Lego toys in order to bring public attention to the campaign.

In the process of frame amplification, social movement organizations disseminated a variety of visual materials. Previous research showed that visual materials play a significant role in framing social issues and mobilizing (Doerr et al., 2013). They offer opportunities for social movement actors to draw public attention to certain issues with striking pictures or sound-bites (Doerr et al., 2013). However, activists can experience a difficult time presenting some environmental issues in the media because they are “geographically distant or dispersed, multinational or international, have a slow onset, are invisible, and are technically complex” (Doyle, 2003, p. 128; see also Yearley, 1991; Beck, 1992; Medler & Medler, 1993; Hannigan, 1995). The process of the formation of environmental issues, such as climate change, that were

potentially impacted by Shell's Arctic oil drilling plan involved complex causes and long-term processes, which made it difficult for social movement organizations to visually present the issues (Doyle, 2003).

In the "Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership" campaign, archived images, such as polar bears walking on broken ice and polar bears clinging to the edge of isolated ice, were used as short-term elements to represent long-term processes of climate change. The pictures that simply showed individual consequences of oil drilling were actually used as symbols or metaphors to indicate and represent a bigger and more complex environmental issue (Goodnow, 2006). In other words, the use of images helped activists circulate complex issues through simple forms of expression. In addition, the mobilizing abilities of these images were powerful (Doerr et al., 2013). The content of these images can produce moral shocks that enabled audiences to affiliate themselves with other activists who had similar identities (Jasper & Poulsen, 1995; Doerr et al., 2013). In other words, individual and short-term elements were able to draw public attention to a long-term and complex issue because they had the ability to arouse moral shocks. Moral shocks also played a critical role in invoking protestors' outrage, and expressing anger and outrage was the key to helping activists overcome anxiety and gain hope for mobilization (Castells, 2015). In addition, governments or corporations as the villains in the conflict may only be able to be depicted as faceless and abstract entities (Doyle, 2003). For example, in order to visualize Lego and Shell corporations in protest messages on Twitter, social movement organizations widely used images of Lego toys to represent Lego and the Shell logo to refer to Shell.

One noticeable framing strategy that social movement organizations used to mobilize movement participants was to leverage the influence of children. The frame analysis shows that the "Boycott the Lego-Shell partnership" campaign intended to rely on Lego's consumers to put

pressure on Lego because consumers have the ability to influence corporate decision making (Holzer, 2010). In the campaign, social movement organizations framed children as victims of the Lego and Shell's partnership. For example, Greenpeace Aus Pac @GreenpeaceAP wrote, "@LEGO_Group don't let @Shell pollute our children's minds! #BlockShell and #SaveTheArctic at grnpc.org/Ig0re." Save The Arctic @savethearctic tweeted, "@ioedge If LEGO cares about children's future, dump the oil company that destroys it #SaveLego #SaveTheArctic grnpc.org/gotweet." As can be seen from these tweets, children were seen as a moral restraint to Lego, and Lego was faced with moral accusations in terms of their responsibility for children. In other words, Lego was essentially blamed by social movement organizations for acting untrustworthy and irresponsible to children who were their main consumer group because their decision of cooperating with Shell was considered to have an adverse impact on children's future.

It seems that social movement organizations attempted to achieve two goals by framing children on Twitter. On one hand, social movement organizations hoped to leverage close ties of children to parents as a transformation of protest frames to better resonate with activists, if the frame of protecting the Arctic's environment turned out to be distant from the public's interests (Holzer, 2010). This idea was suggested by the concept of frame transformation alignment, which requires organizations to explore new values when old values or beliefs cannot resonate with movement participants (Snow et al., 1986). Children were the main target consumers of Lego, but their parents were the actual ones who had power of consumption to purchase Lego products and they were also the potential protestors that social movement organizations intended to recruit to the campaign. Therefore, the frequent use of the word "our children" in the tweets shows that social movement organizations attempted to reach out to parents and to translate their

purchasing acts into negative impacts on their children (Holzer, 2010). By doing so, movement organizations intended to transform parents' shopping decisions as a critical means to pressure Lego (Holzer, 2010). In other words, movement organizations tried to assemble individual powers of resistance by mobilizing protestors' emotion and turning it into a collective purchasing power to exert pressure on Lego.

On the other hand, social movement organizations attempted to provoke Lego to feel guilty by shaping the corporation as the campaign's potential ally on Twitter. For example, Save the Arctic group tweeted, "I loved #LEGO till I heard about its partnership with Arctic destroyer #Shell. Dump Shell to #SaveLego and #SaveTheArctic." Greenpeace Notts tweeted, "#PaganPrideUK loves @LEGO_Group but wants them to #BlockShell and #SaveTheArctic @GreenpeaceNotts." In these tweets, Shell was shaped as the centre of disastrous influence on the Arctic and global climate, while Lego was perceived as a potential ally that social movement organizations can cooperate with to protest against the oil giant Shell. Along with disappointment and grievances, activists also expressed their support and love for Lego in order to encourage Lego to forgo the partnership. Moral leverage was employed by social movement organizations to criticize Lego for harming children's innocence and violating the public's moral values. In order to persuade Lego to abandon its business cooperation with Shell, social movement organizations intended to place Lego in a moral dilemma by framing its loyal consumers as the victims of its partnership with Shell and presenting the ambivalence of disappointment and support from customers.

In addition to Lego and Shell, Greenpeace and their protest strategies were also targeted by individuals during the campaign. These tweets presented criticism of the Greenpeace campaign. For example, A S H L Y N @etcshlynbin tweeted, "@GreenpeaceUK i really want

@LEGO_Group to drop @Shell branding too, but your campaigners are too pushy. #SaveTheArctic.” Despite many movement supporters engaging in protest activities on the Internet and social media or in offline communities, some people did not fully support Greenpeace’s protest action. Also, online tactics allowed by social networking technologies were called in question for their effectiveness. For instance, John Sutton @HGJohn tweeted, “This clicktivist victory to get Shell logos off Lego toys will have zero impact. It won't #SaveTheArctic Stop driving instead, that might.” It did not seem that these low-cost and fast online tactics were considered to be optimal and efficient by all audience members (Bromberg, 2013; Lim, 2013; Schumann & Klein, 2015).

As shown in my data, the mobilizing capacity around the Lego-Shell partnership issue was endorsed by a great number of people, but not every person was convinced by Greenpeace’s campaign approaches and strategies. This finding suggests that the proliferation of social media did not only promote opportunities for self-representation, but this tendency also amplified the challenges to the role of online action (Uldam, 2016). While social media promoted autonomous engagement of individuals in supporting mobilization, they also allowed antagonistic voices to proliferate and become more noticeable.

Another challenge in social media use was surveillance and containment. In this campaign, YouTube was targeted for censoring and blocking Greenpeace’s video *Lego: Everything is not Awesome*. This video was silenced perhaps because the Greenpeace’s video conveyed dissent towards the oil industry that was seen as a potential risk to corporations’ reputations (Bennett, 2003; Costanza-Chock, 2004; Curran et al., 2012; Uldam, 2016). However, the actual reason why this video was taken down could not be found based on my data. Based on my key word search, my data simply shows one side of opinions from movement supporters but

lacks insights into standpoints of Shell and Lego as targeted corporations. This could be a strategy that corporations used to protect their reputations, as suggested in previous research (Uldam, 2016). By choosing not to respond to critiques on Twitter, Lego and Shell intended to avoid potentially falling into more troubles (Uldam, 2016). As such, social movement actors were also confronted with challenges from the surveillance of corporations and governments allowed by social media.

Social Use of Twitter

In this section, I analyze how activists used Twitter to interact with other platforms in order to enrich and promote campaign-related messages by looking at the tactic of link sharing on Twitter.

Link sharing to third party websites on Twitter can be commonly seen during the campaign, and it was widely used to increase the circulation of campaign-related information. In terms of the Twitter content with links shared to online activities, online petition websites accounted for 38.77% of the total tweets with links attached, and links to online donation websites constituted 8.75% of the total tweets. These websites were frequently shared when social movement actors directly asked Lego to stop their partnership with Shell, and online petitions were significant resources for activists to use to protest online.

Content that had links to other social media platforms accounted for 20.68% of the total content with links attached. Specifically, links to YouTube accounted for 60.58% of the total links to social media, links to Vimeo represented 14.42% of the total links, and links to Facebook, Instagram and other tweets on Twitter constituted 4.81% of the total links respectively. Other links to Flickr and Tumblr can be seen on Twitter as well.

As can be seen from my data, YouTube was the most commonly seen platform compared to other social media platforms. Tweets directing users to YouTube usually focused on three themes. The first one was compliment Greenpeace's campaign or campaign video *Lego: Everything is Not Awesome*. For instance, Tracy Van Slyke @tracyvs wrote on Aug 8, 2014, "Great @Greenpeace #lego video ties together culture and campaigns. bit.ly/1ojjZYY #SaveTheArctic." This tweet was written in order to use the video to draw public attention on the campaign. The second theme was expressing grievances about the Lego's partnership with Shell. For example, Bernie Thornton @bernieT36 posted on July 9, 2014, "WATCH this video to see how @Shell is selling propaganda to kids. Shame on you @Lego_Group bit.ly/1j8Moiz #savethearctic #BlockShell." This user showed criticism to Lego and Shell and intended to use the video *Lego: Everything is Not Awesome* to support his opinion. The third theme was asking Lego to forgo its partnership with Shell. For example, Blanca Figuerola @BlancaFiguerola wrote, "Join our movement to #savethearctic by telling @LEGO_Group to cut its ties with #Shell! See video: xurl.es/ecuay". It seems that the video *Lego: Everything is Not Awesome* was shared to support and explain her proposal for protest action against the Lego and Shell's partnership.

The video *Lego, everything is not awesome* was the most well-known video and it received 6 million views on the Internet during the "Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership" campaign (Kirchoff, Van Couvering, & Fast, 2015). This video was completely animated with Lego products criticizing the partnership of Lego and Shell as polluting children's minds and ruining the Arctic. In the video, the rising and spreading "black sea water" was gradually drowning animals and humans in the Arctic, visualizing that global warming was increasing the sea level and oil spills were destroying wildlife and the environment. This 1.46-minute video

utilized elements of Lego and Shell to imply that the cooperation of the two companies in the real world was going to bring disastrous consequences to the environment and human life.

The sharing of video resources from YouTube provided social movement actors with more autonomy and diverse resources, such as audio, visual and written materials, to frame their movement messages. In addition, the YouTube video was circulated on Twitter by activists in order to supply extra information to draw public attention to the campaign, justify activists' protest activities, and recruit potential supports to engage in the campaign. As argued in previous research, YouTube has become a prevalent social media platform for people to diffuse, view and archive videos documenting protests in recent years because it offers individuals free, simple and relatively effortless approaches to record, share and spread their messages (Askanius, 2013). YouTube plays a role in offering an afterlife for those protest moments that are left behind in offline spaces because YouTube provides the opportunity for activists to use a variety of creative ways to document and rearticulate the ephemeral visual expressions produced in protests which may have been forgotten and neglected (Askanius, 2013). In my research, the analysis of the video *Lego: Everything is Not Awesome* shows that YouTube can also be used by activists to release early warnings of potential consequences of protested issues. By doing so, the campaign hoped to recruit potential supporters to prevent the Lego-Shell partnership from causing detrimental impacts on the environment in the future.

Twitter content connected to online news institutions accounted for 16.70% of the total content with links attached. *The Guardian* news website was the most commonly shared by activists, which accounted for 36.90% of the total link sharing to online news institutions. Twitter content linked to *The Huffington Post* constituted 14.29% of all the link sharing to news media. Link sharing to CBC website represented 5.88%. Other news media websites that are

shared on Twitter included the websites of *Business Insider*, *Forbes*, *Global News*, *Sky News*, *The Times*, and *The Wall Street Journal*.

As shown in my data, articles posted in *The Guardian* website were the most commonly seen compared to other mass media websites during the campaign. Most articles from *The Guardian* website were shared when Twitter users intended to inform audiences of the successful ending of Lego's partnership with Shell. For example, Greenpeace USA @greenpeaceusa on Oct. 9, 2014 wrote "Thanks! Together we'll #SavetheArctic RT @sierraclub Congrats @greenpeaceusa for your great Lego victory over Shell!" and attached an article named "Lego ends Shell Partnership following Greenpeace Campaign" from *The Guardian* website. This article provided audiences with details of how Lego made the decision to stop renewing its contract with Shell under Greenpeace's pressure. As such, activists intended to provide more details to help audiences gain a better understanding of the progress and result of the campaign. In addition to news articles reporting the severing of Lego and Shell's partnership, other news articles circulated on Twitter mainly focused on discussing details of the content of Greenpeace video *Lego, everything is not awesome*, the progress of Greenpeace's campaign or perspectives against Shell.

As can be seen from my data, most news articles from mass media were used by activists in Twitter posts when they informed audiences of the progress of the campaign with more detailed information and justified protest activities for recruiting potential supporters to engage in the campaign. This finding indicates that mass media³ is used as a representative of authority as gatekeeper to authenticate movement information and influence public opinions (Iyengar, 1991; Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Mattoni, 2012). This may be attributed to the capacity of

³ A detailed analysis of mass media content is not presented since it is outside the scope of my research project.

media frames that “operate to select and highlight some features of reality and obscure others in a way that tells a consistent story about problems, their causes, moral implications, and remedies” (Entman, 2004, p. 77). By apply this structural logic, media frames functioned to promote interpretation, evaluation and solutions in the campaign (Entman, 2004; Rivenburgh, 2013). Moreover, protestors tended to cite news articles that were sympathetic to movements in order to justify the rationality of movements because these articles contributed positive media coverage, legitimated activists’ perspectives, and criticized the attitudes of governments or stakeholders (Papaioannou, 2015).

Links to organizational websites shared by activists on Twitter accounted for 14.91% of the total link sharing. The majority of these links were directed to Greenpeace websites, which constituted 85.33% of the total link sharing to organizational websites. Links to other organizational websites, such as EcoWatch, can also be seen on Twitter. Specifically, the linked articles from Greenpeace websites focused on showing more detailed information about plans for the campaign, articulating reasons for taking action, and updating activists’ online and offline activists. These articles were mostly used to support tweets that discussed Lego severing its partnership with Shell and asked movement participants to pressure Lego to end its partnership with Shell. Despite the important role of mass media attention, my findings show that environmental websites⁴ can provide more detailed articulation of campaign-related information that can support the campaign and more favourable statements that can shape public opinions (Stoddart & MacDonald, 2011; Stoddart et al., 2015).

My analysis of different types of link sharing shows that the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign made strategic use of a broad range of communication resources and

⁴ A detailed analysis of environmental website content is not presented since it is outside the scope of my research project.

operated within complex and multifaceted repertoires of communication (Mattoni, 2013).

Content created by authors on websites, such as online news articles and organizational articles, and user-generated content on different social media platforms, such as YouTube, Facebook and Instagram, were both seen on Twitter (Walther & Jang, 2012; Neubaum & Krämer, 2017).

Specifically, my findings suggest that social media platforms were tools to circulate information with individual and self-configurable features that were not usually seen on mainstream mass media or organizational websites. In addition, Twitter as a social media platform played a role in converging information from mass media and organizations, rather than offering detailed and comprehensive information that organizational websites and mass media websites were more proficient in. As such, the use of social media has not replaced mass media in contemporary social movements. Instead, a variety of communication channels are interconnected and coordinated in mobilization.

Summary

The analysis of the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign shows an evolving relationship of individuals and social movement organizations in which social movement organizations still played an important role in mobilizing while keeping a coordinating relationship with digitally networked individuals. A number of social movement organizations achieved a larger scale of action through mesomobilization on Twitter. In order to mobilize the campaign, activists framed campaign-related discourses through both written and visual communication. Specifically, activists mobilized both online and offline action as opportunities for people to engage in the campaign and used morality as emotional leverage to recruit potential campaign supporters. In order to promote campaign-related content, activists made strategic use

of a broader range of communication resources and operated within a more complex and multifaceted media environment that was facilitated by repertoires of communication (Mattoni, 2013).

In the next section, I examine the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign and explore the similarities and differences between both of the campaigns.

Critical Event Two: the “Free the Arctic 30” Campaign

As part of the campaign against oil exploitation in the Arctic, 30 Greenpeace activists and crew members from different countries sailed the Greenpeace ship *Arctic Sunrise* into the Arctic and attempted to land at Gazprom’s Prirazlomnaya drilling platform as an action to call for an end to Arctic drilling in September 2013. When 30 people were climbing the platform, they were prevented immediately and arrested by the Russian authorities for further investigation. As the news spread, a large number of people started protesting against the Russian authorities by mobilizing a variety of action with the hashtag “#freethearctic30” on Twitter to ask for the release of the 30 Greenpeace activists. Compared to the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign, the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign further exploited Twitter’s mobilizing abilities due to the event’s complexity. I examine the hashtag activities on Twitter in order to provide insights into the dynamics of the mobilization of the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign.

Social Movement Actors

Like the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign, activists who played a part in the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign can still be defined as individual participants and social movement organizations (see Table 2).

| Greenpeace Organizations | | | Other Groups |
|--------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------|
| Arctic Sunrise | GP Activist Network | GP Arctic Watch | 350 Australia |
| Greenpeace | GP Rainbow Warrior | Greenpeace Aus Pac | Climate Reality |
| Greenpeace Bristol | GP Volunteering Lab | Greenpeace Japan | Friends of the Earth |
| Greenpeace France | Greenpeace Africa | Greenpeace Cherbourg | ABC the Drum |
| Greenpeace Czech | Greenpeace Andalucia | Greenpeace Dusseldorf | EcoWatch |
| Greenpeace EU | Greenpeace Belgium | Greenpeace Canterbury | HHS Earth Club |
| Greenpeace Hannover | Greenpeace East Asia | Greenpeace Canada | WWF |
| Greenpeace India | Greenpeace Huddersfield | Greenpeace Illes Balears | WWF EU |
| Greenpeace Korea | Greenpeace Leeds | Greenpeace Napoli | WWF New Zealand |
| Greenpeace Newcastle | Greenpeace Niederrh | Greenpeace Netherlands | WWF Australia |
| Greenpeace Russia | Greenpeace Oxford | Greenpeace New Zealand | WWF Scotland |
| Greenpeace Pictures | Greenpeace Philippines | Greenpeace Pacific Northwest | WWF UK |
| Greenpeace Pix | Greenpeace Portsmouth | Greenpeace Reunion | Mid Island News |
| Greenpeace Quebec | Greenpeace Pressdesk | Greenpeace Slovensko | Imperiled Oceans |
| Greenpeace Suomi | Greenpeace Starsbourg | Greenpeace Southeast Asia | |
| Greenpeace Sverige | Greenpeace UK | Greenpeace Switzerland | |
| Greenpeace USA | Greenpeace Vancouver | Greenpeace Waltham Forest | |
| Greenpeace Vaud | Save the Arctic | | |

Table 2 Organizational Accounts in the “Free the Arctic 30” Campaign

My data shows that organizations created 20.39% of the campaign-related information that was collected on Twitter while individual participants produced 79.61% of the total content. In terms of retweets in the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign, the majority of the retweets were originally produced by social movement organizations, especially Arctic Sunrise, Greenpeace and Greenpeace UK. Previous research suggested that retweeting happens when Twitter users find the content is impressive and worth spreading (Marwick, 2013). This means social movement organizations as movement information sources were given more importance and endorsement. In other words, Twitter content created by social movement organizations resonated with social movement actors more than the content produced by individual participants. As with the finding explored in the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign, Greenpeace organizations as well as other groups still played a central role in mobilizing the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign despite the fact that individual participants produced more campaign-related content on Twitter.

Commonly retweeted content focused on two themes. The first one was calling for help for the arrested 30 Greenpeace activists. For example, Arctic Sunrise tweeted, “This Saturday in #Sydney stand with the Arctic 30 bit.ly/Arctic30_Syd #freethearctic30.” Greenpeace Africa tweeted, “Show your support for the Arctic 30, add the twibbon to your profile pics: bit.ly/1ev06Zc #FreeTheArctic30.” These tweets show that Greenpeace employed the strategy of calling on people to take action to help release 30 Greenpeace activists. Also, Greenpeace created both opportunities for individual participants to protest both online and offline. The second commonly retweeted theme was online and offline support for the campaign. For instance, Greenpeace Aus Pac sent the following online support to the arrested activist: “@alexharris1 our mate, fellow diver + all-round super cool work colleague - everyone stands

with u #freethearctic30 ow.ly/i/3dltT.” Greenpeace Canada tweeted “Crowds still coming in to show ♡ for #FreeTheArctic30 @ #wellington Russian Embassy via @AskWhoopass” with a photo of the offline protest scene attached to the Twitter post. Because online action can mobilize action-oriented emotions, increase activists’ sense of empowerment, and help protestors build collective identities, online action plays an important role in promoting activists’ offline engagement (Nip, 2004; Drury et al., 2005; Hara, 2008; Wojcieszak, 2009; Schumann & Klein, 2015). In other words, tweets created by organizations serve as a source for individual motivation (Klandermans, 2004; Earl & Kimport, 2011; Staggenborg & Ramos, 2016). This means that social movement organizations play a vital role in offering momentum to movement participants, creating protest opportunities and devising strategies (Klandermans, 2004; Earl & Kimport, 2011; Staggenborg & Ramos, 2016).

Despite claims in previous research in the waning influence of social movement organizations (Earl & Schussman, 2003; Shirky, 2008; Earl & Kimport, 2011; Castells, 2015) and the increasing importance of digitally networked individualist forms of activism in social movements (Castells, 2015; Kleinhans, Van Ham & Evans-Cowley, 2015), the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign shows that social movement organizations remains vital as key social actors. They are diffusers of information and frames, and organizers of collective action. Social media may allow individual participants to diffuse information to a broader audience, but social movement organizations still play a vital role in initiating and structuring collective action within the social media field. This is a consistent finding that also appeared in the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign.

However, as with the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign, potential activities of astroturfing organizations also challenged the role of networked individuals in mobilizing the

“Free the Arctic 30” campaign. While some individual protestors could be fake activists sponsored by corporations and governments to manipulate movement discourses (Cho, Martens, Kim, & Rodrigue, 2011; Greenberg et al., 2011; Wear, 2014), it was beyond my abilities to assess or evaluate which users were or were not manipulated by astroturfing organizations.

In addition to the findings of the changing relationship of social movement organizations and digitally networked individuals from the centralized leadership of social movement organizations over individual participants (Castells, 2015; Staggenborg & Ramos, 2016), my data also shows an evolving relationship of the leading social movement organization and other groups in a movement. In terms of all the social movement organizations that produced campaign-related information on Twitter, Greenpeace groups produced 96.84% of the total content while other groups generated 3.16% of the total content. Greenpeace organizations still played a major role in leading the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign with the use of Twitter, but many other organizations, such as World Wildlife Fund (WWF), also engaged in action calling for the release of 30 Greenpeace activists. Compared to the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign, more regional Greenpeace groups participated in the mobilization of the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign. Moreover, different organizations were inclined to diffuse campaign-related messages that focused on similar themes.

As with the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign, calling for action from supporters to boycott targeted parties and showing protest action were strategies that Greenpeace commonly used to mobilize support for the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign. Greenpeace is known for their direct action and contentious identity (Corrigall-Brown, 2016). Direct action, such as calling for audiences to pressure the Russian government, enables Greenpeace to bring credibility and draw media attention to the conflict because it is aligned with the general

impression of who they were as a group (Corrigall-Brown, 2016). In addition, audiences have the expectation of social movements in which social movement organizations will criticize and change the government decision, and meeting the expectation of the audiences can help groups increase their media coverage (Corrigall-Brown, 2016). As such, in order to achieve the protest goals, Greenpeace attempted to impress audiences and draw media attention to the issue by highlighting that they were dedicated to pressuring the government to release the Arctic 30 with the use of direct action.

The analysis of my data shows that Greenpeace played a major role in mobilizing Russia to release 30 Greenpeace activists. However, other organizations also played a part in mobilizing support for the campaign. As such, Greenpeace organizations including the head office and regional branches worked in solidarity with other organizations. In other words, the mobilization of releasing 30 Greenpeace activists relied on the coordination of multiple groups rather than a single organization. Greenpeace's ability of mobilizing other organizations to enlarge the scope of protests was seen in both the "Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership" campaign and the "Free the Arctic 30" campaign (Gerhards & Rucht, 1992; Earl & Kimport, 2011).

In terms of Greenpeace organizations that circulated campaign-related content on Twitter, Arctic Sunrise produced 28.38% of the total content, Greenpeace generated 9.59% of the total content, Greenpeace UK created 8.27% of the total content, Greenpeace PressDesk diffused 5.64% of the total content, Greenpeace New Zealand contributed 5.26% of the total content, Greenpeace USA posted 3.76% of the total content, and Save the Arctic disseminated 3.57% of the total content. Similar to the "Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership" campaign, the "Free the Arctic 30" campaign did not simply rely on the head office of Greenpeace. Rather, it

was a coordination of the head office and many Greenpeace regional offices that facilitated the campaign.

While circulating a common goal of asking the Russian government to release the Arctic 30, regional groups also mobilized differently by organizing offline activities in their local communities and producing campaign-related information in supporters' native languages. Since the captured 30 activists came from different countries, regional Greenpeace organizations sometimes also attempted to mobilize individual participants by drawing protestors attention to the activists who were from their local communities. For example, two of Greenpeace UK's tweets stated: "Kieron's family have shared a letter he sent from Russian prison: thetim.es/1gbroWp (paywall link, apologies) #FreeTheArctic30" and "Kieron's friend Max wants to see him released immediately. You too can help #FreeTheArctic30: greenpeace.org/freeouractivis ..." These tweets intended to mobilize social movement actors to help release Kieron Bryan who was a journalist from the UK. In order to mobilize a broad audience to take action against the Russian government, regional groups attempted to associate their campaign-related information with local supporters' cultural contexts. In other words, regional groups played an important role in localizing the international issue of releasing 30 Greenpeace activists by enabling the issue to resonate with local citizens' cultural backgrounds (Dauvergne & Neville, 2011). As such, the "Free the Arctic 30" campaign relied on a coalition of many regional branches instead of one single head office.

Therefore, my findings suggest that the "mesomobilization" of Greenpeace and other social movement organizations, such as WWF and Nature for Life Conservation Initiative, has not been replaced by social media. Instead, social media provides autonomous spaces for social movement organizations to coordinate and opportunities for a leading organization to potentially

reach out to more organizations (Bennett, 2003a, 2003b, 2004a, 2004b; Earl & Kimport, 2011). In addition, mobilizing campaign-related discourses in different cultural contexts is an online strategy that social movement organizations employ to resonate with more potential supporters and recruit more protestors to participate in mobilization around international issues.

Campaign Targets

In this section, I discuss who were framed as the targets of the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign claim-making and mobilization on Twitter. Then, I use framing theories to examine how the targeted issue was interpreted and mobilized on Twitter.

The main focus of campaign targets was the Russian authorities, which accounted for 53.00% of the total content identified with targets. All the Twitter content targeting Russian authorities presented strongly negative attitudes of protestors towards Russian action regarding the 30 activists. The majority of tweets targeting the Russian government called on the Russian authorities to release 30 Arctic Sunrise activists or condemned the Russian government for using unjustified punishment on the 30 activists. For example, Greenpeace NZ wrote, “Join over 600,000 people who've sent a message to the Russian Embassy to #FreeTheArctic30 greenpeace.org/freeouractivis...” Greenpeace UK wrote, “Tell @RussianEmbassy to #FreeTheArctic30. Peaceful protesters are being held illegally. The world is watching [greenpeace.org/freeouractivis ...](http://greenpeace.org/freeouractivis...)” These tweets show that the Russian government was at the center of the conflict and it was considered to be the main culprit of the whole “Free the Arctic 30” campaign.

In order to pressure the Russian authorities to release the Arctic 30, social movement organizations offered protest opportunities to movement adherents and mobilized them to engage

in both online and offline activities. Twitter was employed by social movement organizations to connect to potential supporters who shared the same grievances towards the Russian government but lacked strategies to pursue their goals (Snow et al., 1986). This finding is similar to the finding in the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign that was supported by the concept of frame bridging alignment (Snow et al., 1986). According to my data, a large number of tweets appealed to supporters to participate in online and offline activities. This indicates that the mobilizing feature of Twitter was considered to be significant and its mobilizing ability was widely exploited by social movement organizations in the campaign.

Despite the fact that online action was encouraged more frequently than offline action on Twitter, social movement organizations attempted to coordinate both types of action for supporters to participate in. The available online activities in this campaign mostly focused on signing online petitions, emailing the Russian Embassy, and adding a Twitter profile picture by using Twibbon. Support activities in offline communities, such as demonstrations and gatherings, were also informed and advertised on Twitter in order to recruit potential supporters. Sometimes, both online and offline activities were offered together in one tweet in order to encourage social actors to engage in both types of action. Similar to the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign, low-threshold online participation creates autonomous spaces for protestors to plan out their offline protest strategies (Castells, 2015). Online action can also increase activists’ sense of empowerment and accomplishment and help construct collective identities (Nip, 2004; Drury et al., 2005; Hara, 2008; Wojcieszak, 2009). These action-oriented emotions can foster subsequent offline action (Schumann & Klein, 2015), and these offline activities can optimize communication among activists (Davis, 2011). Because offline action

symbolized the power of invading sites of state power, mobilizing protestors to engage in offline activities was likely to create tangible pressure on the Russian government (Castells, 2015).

In order to better resonate with movement supporters during the campaign, social movement organizations adopted a strategy of frame amplification to optimize their campaign frames by promoting the relevant discourses on supporters' beliefs about how severe the issue or grievance was, beliefs about how effective the movement would be, and beliefs about how necessary it was to take action on the issue (Snow et al., 1986). One task related to frame amplification was to clarify the severity of the issue of arresting 30 Arctic Sunrise activists (Snow et al., 1986). In order to accomplish this goal, Greenpeace and other organizations justified the Arctic 30's protest action against oil drilling. Social movement organizations expressed their disagreement with the Russian government's definition of the 30 activists as "pirates" or "hooligans".

On one hand, social movement organizations directly expressed their grievances and criticism to the Russian government. For example, Greenpeace widely circulated a video documenting the Russian special forces confronting Greenpeace activists on the Gazprom Arctic oil rig. This video described that Russian border guards stormed the Arctic Sunrise ship and locked up 30 Greenpeace activists after they attempted to climb Gazprom's Arctic oil platform off the north-eastern coast of Russia. In the video, Russian coast guards wearing black masks pointed knives and guns at Greenpeace activists, while the activists voluntarily raised their hands in front of the coast guards. The video also showed scenes in which Greenpeace activists were pushed over by Russian coast guards. The elements shown about Russian coast guard in the film, such as their equipment, movement and appearance, were framed to represent toughness and

violence. However, Greenpeace intended to frame their activists as powerless victims by showing the peaceful side of their performance in response to the coast guards' action.

This video archived the events that happened in offline spaces. In this context, images as the signifier of veracity were used to encode the reality and provided an opportunity for audiences to access the messages that perhaps had never been available to them (Askanius, 2013). By using strategies of sequence construction and linking, Greenpeace evoked individual anger towards the Russian government by showing the most striking and dramatic moments of the event. However, this does not mean that the video showed the full story of the incident. Although social media provides individuals with the autonomy to adopt their own frames to rearticulate protests in online contexts (Rainie & Wellman, 2012; Askanius, 2013; Castells, 2015), this also offers activists the opportunity to intentionally discard some fragments of protests that are not beneficial to support protest activities. In other words, in addition to allowing reality to be archived, reproduced and given new meanings (Askanius, 2013), social media can also be used to distort reality. In addition, getting arrested on campaign may be an incident that Greenpeace deliberately caused in order to manipulate media attention for environmental issues (Doyle, 2003). Therefore, it is likely that the recorded and released content in the video is planned beforehand. In this case, social media was not simply used by social movement organizations to have an interactive and horizontal communication with movement participants. Rather, it was used to manipulate or even mislead activists.

On the other hand, social movement organizations attempted to express grievances to the Russian government by showing supportive perspectives. Social movement organizations showed supportive opinions from a variety of authoritative representatives in order to object to the arrest of 30 activists by the Russian government. These parties included environmental

experts, Nobel Peace Laureates and international politicians. For example, Arctic Sunrise tweeted, “Dutch request maritime court to order release of the Arctic 30 greenpeace.org/international/... #FreeTheArctic30.” Greenpeace Aus Pac wrote, “12 Nobel Peace Prize Laureates have voiced their support to #FreeTheArctic30. Join the call: bit.ly/193QHUR.” In addition, social movement organizations justified the 30 activists as peaceful people but not hooligans. For example, Arctic Sunrise wrote, “The man behind the photos that showed us the threat to the Arctic! Denis Sinyakov greenpeace.org/international/... #FreeTheArctic30.” Greenpeace tweeted, “Some heroes are just normal people doing their best to help save the planet: act.gp/17BxXfa #FreeTheArctic30.” In these tweets, social movement organizations intended to leave an impression on audiences that 30 activists were peaceful activists who contributed to protecting the environment and the Russian government was the one who was actually violent and unjust, which framed the 30 activists as victims that needed to be protected.

Another task in the frame amplification process is to improve movement frames to enhance movement adherents’ beliefs in how effective the movement will become (Snow et al., 1986). In order to achieve this goal, Greenpeace and other organizations frequently updated the information about the progress of the campaign. For example, Greenpeace wrote, “Greenpeace @Greenpeace · 21 Nov 2013 Court hearings over for today. 26 of 30 now granted bail and 5 of those are out of jail. #FreeColin #FreeTheArctic30.” News about the Russian government removing charges from 30 activists and releasing the activists on bail were shown as effective progress for the campaign. In addition, social movement organizations widely disseminated online and offline support from celebrities, international political forces, Nobel Peace Laureates, the Arctic 30’s family members, environmental experts, legal experts, and the Russian president

Putin. For example, Greenpeace EU tweeted, “100+ MEPs from 21 #EU countries (7 groups) say #FreeTheArctic30 & protect the #Arctic! greenpeace.org/eu-unit/en/blog...” In these tweets, social movement organizations framed the widespread support from a variety of parties as an effective means to facilitate the campaign. By illustrating that the campaign managed to receive plenty of support and recruit many supporters to protest against the Russian government, social movement organizations attempted to help movement supporters gain faith in the campaign.

In order to articulate how necessary it was to take action on the issue (Snow et al., 1986), social movement organizations targeted oil giant Gazprom and criticized activities of oil exploitation for their disastrous impacts on the environment. In order to mobilize campaign supporters to pressure Russia to release the 30 activists, social movement organizations intended to convince the audiences that it was wrong for the Russian government to capture 30 activists who protested against oil giant Gazprom. In order to help movement adherents better understand why it was valuable to boycott Gazprom, social movement organizations articulated information about environmental threat to the Arctic that was potentially caused by Gazprom. For example, Greenpeace wrote, “10 reasons to take action to stop #Gazprom's Prirazlomnaya oil platform: act.gp/HkWkTQ #SaveTheArctic #FreeTheArctic30.” Another example produced by Greenpeace was: “More than 30 million barrels of oil are spilled on land each year by the Russian oil industry: act.gp/19U3oDE #FreeTheArctic30.” In these tweets, social movement organizations framed oil giant Gazprom as an evil corporation and the 30 activists’ protest against Gazprom as justified and peaceful action to protect the environment.

As with what was shown in the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign, polar bear images were frequently diffused to symbolize the emergence of environmental issues that were potentially caused by Arctic oil drilling. The use of polar bear images conveyed a message

that polar bears were losing their home because of global warming. By circulating these polar bear images, protestors tried to indicate that the Arctic was becoming vulnerable because of oil drilling. Previous research argued that striking images depicting destruction attract public attention and trigger a moral commitment to act (Anne DiFrancesco & Young, 2011). Thus, the destruction of the polar bear's living environment in the Arctic caused by global warming had the capacity to evoke moral shocks among audiences. Moral shocks play a crucial role in evoking activists' outrage, and expressing anger and outrage is the key to help activists overcome anxiety and gain hope for mobilization (Castells, 2015). In other words, polar bear imagery was used as symbolic material to mobilize supporters to express their outrage towards the Russian government and oil giant Gazprom and gain hope for the campaign. This is a consistent finding that is also shown in the "Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership" campaign.

Apart from polar bear imagery, other visual content was also applied to help frame the Arctic 30 issue in the campaign. Photos showing offline protest activities were frequently circulated on Twitter. Similar to the finding in the "Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership" campaign, images of Greenpeace's micro-dramas were shown in order to protest against the Russian government in the "Free the Arctic 30" campaign. Micro-dramas, often in the form of bold direct action, is a central tactic created by Greenpeace (Doyle, 2003). These stunts are well-planned and organized in order to overcome difficulties in gaining media attention for environmental issues (Doyle, 2003). In addition to common stunts, such as holding banners with brief messages and wearing costumes, Greenpeace also circulated more striking moments of the campaign on Twitter. One image that was frequently shared on Twitter depicted a Greenpeace activist scaling the Eiffel Tower with a banner reading "Free the Arctic 30". Another commonly-seen image showed activists sitting in a big model of a cage that referred to the prison where 30

Arctic Sunrise activists were kept. Thirty activists getting arrested on camera by Russian coast guards seemed to be another important media stunt that Greenpeace created to draw media attention to the conflict. This is because the action of getting arrested is considered to be deviant, or different from the norm, which is a key characteristic of newsworthiness (Ericson, Baranek & Chan, 1987; Doyle, 2003; Lundahl, 2018). Many of these events were documented and diffused through photography. Photographs can be carriers and amplifiers of injustice frames, which explains how an authority system violates the shared moral beliefs of the general public (Olesen, 2013). Photographs are potentially able to circulate local/national injustice frames to transnational audiences (Olesen, 2013). For example, polar bear images were used to vividly depict disastrous impacts of oil drilling on the Arctic's environment in order to show that the government and oil industry violated the public's moral beliefs. In addition to the use of protest banners and the #freethearctic30 hashtag on protest posters, the restriction of the cage represented in the photographs alluded to the injustice that the Russian government brought to the 30 Greenpeace activists. In order to recruit potential supporters to participate in the campaign from different regions and countries, campaign participants presented the injustice frame targeting the Russian government's action on 30 Greenpeace activists through visual communication and disseminated their disagreement with the Russian government to global audiences.

In addition, images depicting a dove soaring on a rainbow were circulated to show international support. The symbol was also commonly seen in pictures and videos of online and offline activities. The symbol of a dove soaring on a rainbow was originally used by Arctic Sunrise activists on their ship in order to represent their protest action against oil exploitation. Visual markers assist individuals in identifying the orientation of a group and whether or not

they belong to a protest as allies (Doerr et al., 2013). Thus, this symbol itself can help the campaign gain visibility and remind audiences of 30 activists' protest action, and the frequent use of this symbol in online and offline activities indicates that movement participants sent consolidated support to the 30 activists.

In addition to using the tactic of frame alignment to mobilize, the strategies of targeting international politicians and celebrities were also employed in the "Free the Arctic 30" campaign. In terms of international political forces, Brazilian, Indian, South African, Australian, British and Canadian politicians were all targeted on Twitter. On one hand, they were mostly targeted by protestors as potential campaign allies to pressure Russia to release the Arctic 30. For example, Greenpeace Aus Pac tweeted, "We are renewing calls for Aus. Govt to step up efforts to secure release of Colin Russell [greenpeace.org/au/action/?cid=53](https://www.greenpeace.org/au/action/?cid=53) #freethearctic30." On the other hand, governments, such as UK and Canada, were also criticized by activists for not providing sufficient support to detained British and Canadian. For example, Greenpeace Portsmouth tweeted, "@David_Cameron #gazprom deal with UK energy minister? That why so little's happening to #FreeTheArctic30? #greenpeace [gazprom.com/f/posts/68/960](https://www.gazprom.com/f/posts/68/960)..."

As can be seen in my findings, protestors called for support from other countries' politicians in order to assemble international political forces to address this issue. This finding can be explained by applying the idea of the boomerang effect. This strategy may be used by social movement actors to call for action from their international political allies in order to exert pressure on their domestic governments and optimize their domestic political practices when channels between the state and its domestic actors were blocked (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Holzer, 2010). Transnational activists use this strategy to shape issues in transnational activism in order to bring local or domestic issues to international attention. The notion of the boomerang effect

was developed by Keck and Sikkink (1998) primarily in reference to movements in the Global South that intend to draw on resources and political power of social movements in the Global North in order to generate pressure on governments within the Global South (Stoddart et al., 2016).

However, the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign shows the tactic of the boomerang effect has evolved. In the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign, activists employed the boomerang effect strategy to bring the issue of the arrest of 30 Greenpeace activists to the attention of international politicians in the hope of mobilizing the Russian government to release the thirty activists. As shown in this campaign, the boomerang effect was no longer about generating international pressure in support of social movements primarily in the Global South. This is consistent with the similar argument made about the international targeting of the Canadian government in the previous research of Stoddart and his colleagues (Stoddart et al., 2016). My research findings show that the boomerang effect was also used by transnational activists to draw international politicians to the Russian government’s action on 30 Greenpeace activists within the Global North. This indicates that Twitter, as one of the social media platforms, did not only provide international audiences with access to a variety of information, but also allowed them to bypass the control of the government and become their own broadcasters (Earl & Kimport, 2011; Rainie & Wellman, 2012; Serres, 2014; Castells, 2015; Ceron & Memoli, 2016). In other words, social media can break restrictions on communication channels between the state and its domestic citizens, and serve as tools for activists to bypass their state and reach out to international allies more easily and quickly. Thanks to social media, activists have more opportunities and resources to express their concerns for environmental issues to domestic and international governments than they did in the past.

In addition to calling for help from international politicians, social movement organizations also tried to draw celebrities' attention to the event of the arrest of 30 Greenpeace activists. This strategy was also employed in the "Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership" campaign. In the "Free the Arctic 30" campaign, celebrities were mostly asked to help release the 30 activists from Russia. For example, Greenpeace Cherbourg wrote, "@SamuelLJackson please tweet your support now to #FreeTheArctic30, detained for peacefully defending the planet greenpeace.org/freeouractivis..." In this tweet, Samuel L. Jackson as an American actor and film producer was asked by Greenpeace Cherbourg to help release the Arctic 30. Previous research argued that celebrities play a big role in networking with their followers on social media, disseminating messages and speaking out for environmental issues as spokespeople with the help of their fame (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993; Meyer & Gamson, 1995; Brockington, 2008; Brockington, 2009; Ellcessor, 2018). This indicates that the celebrity's opinions are considered to be significant leverage to influence public discourses, and their protest action helps influence government decision-making. Thus, it is possible that protestors expected to leverage celebrities' mobilizing abilities to recruit more potential supporters to participate in the campaign and to exert pressure on the Russian government. In addition, it seems that protestors recruited celebrities by leveraging their reliance on building fame through conservation. Participating in environmental movements could offer credit to celebrities (Brockington, 2008). Because social media can easily expose celebrities' personalities and make it possible for audiences to directly access celebrities (Ellcessor, 2012), how celebrities decide to get involved in social movements on social media directly impacts whether or not they can become famous and accepted by audiences. As such, protestors chose to target celebrities because they were likely to receive

support from those celebrities who intended to build their fame by improving their performance on conversation on social media.

In addition to supportive discourses on Twitter, counter-movement opinions against Greenpeace can also be seen in my data. For example, Twitter user “Assad” wrote, “Those Greenpeace idiots deserve to be jailed for 7 years for attacking Russia's oil platform. Not invited! #GREENPEACE #FreeTheArctic30.” This tweet shows that the action of 30 Greenpeace activists was strongly objected to by some audience members and the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign was not supported. In the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign, social media enabled all different kinds of voices to be heard. While it increased the exposure of perspectives supporting the campaign, it also made counter-movement opinions become visible. In other words, social media has brought the opportunities to social movements, but they have also resulted in more challenges to social movement actors.

Also, online action was called in question for its effectiveness. For instance, Twitter user “Yrjö Kari-Koskinen” wrote, “Sad stuff happening at the @gp_sunrise. Feels like there's not much we can do just by tweeting and mailing #FreeTheArctic30 #SaveTheArctic.” This tweet shows that low-cost and fast online tactics are also considered to be ineffective by some people (Bromberg, 2013; Lim, 2013; Schumann & Klein, 2015). Similar to what is suggested in the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign, while providing more opportunities for individuals to mobilize, online tactics allowed by social media platforms are not fully embraced and may be critiqued by some Twitter users.

Another challenge from social media use was related to surveillance and containment, which is also a challenge witnessed in the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign. In the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign, Russian news media was accused of censoring the relevant

protest images. For example, Twitter user “Nathaniel @SavageNatPelle” wrote, “Russian media blacks out photos in solidarity with photographer jailed with Greenpeace activists #FreeTheArctic30.” This tweet described that the photos taken by the arrested journalist Denis depicting the conflict between Russian coast guards and 30 Greenpeace activists were censored by several Russian media outlets. These photos were censored because Gazprom and the Russian government may see them as a potential risk to the government’s and the corporation’s reputations (Costanza-Chock, 2004, p. 274; see also Bennett, 2003; Curran et al., 2012; Uldam, 2016). As such, social movement actors are also confronted with challenges from surveillance by corporations and governments on social media. In addition, my data shows one side of opinions from campaign supporters but lacks insights into standpoints of Gazprom and the Russian government as targeted parties. This could be a strategy that corporations used to protect their reputations (Uldam, 2016). By choosing not to respond to critiques on Twitter, Gazprom and the Russian government potentially tried to avoid negative impacts on them (Uldam, 2016).

Social Use of Twitter

In the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign, link sharing was a main feature of Twitter that activists used to reach out to other users and proliferate protest messages. Link sharing for external websites was still a common online tactic employed by social movement actors. Among all the tweets with links attached, over 40% of the content was linked to online campaigns, such as online petition, online emailing, letter writing, and online donations. In this campaign, the use of link sharing focused on online campaign strategies and these strategies seemed to be more diverse than the other case. As shown in my data, these websites were frequently shared when social movement actors urged the Russian government to release the Greenpeace activists. This

finding indicates that Twitter was considered to be an important platform which can direct movement supporters to participate in the campaign, especially by taking online action.

Tweets attached to links to organization websites accounted for 23.56% of all the tweets with links. The majority of these links are directed to Greenpeace websites, which constituted 93.68% of the total link sharing to organizational websites. Links to other organizational websites, such as the websites of WWF, O Dia da Terra, 350, EcoWatch, and Nobel Women's Initiative, can also be seen on Twitter. As shown in my data, more organizational websites were linked in tweets in the "Free the Arctic 30" campaign than the other case, but Greenpeace websites were still the most widely shared compared to other organizational websites.

The commonly shared articles from organization websites focused on showing detailed information about online and offline activities that protestors can participate in, articulating reasons to support the campaign, and updating the progress that activists made in protest activities. These articles were mainly shared in tweets that motivated campaign supporters to pressure the Russian government to release the Arctic 30 and justify the Arctic 30's protest action against the Russian oil industry. For instance, Twitter user Mary Grace Kosta wrote, "Here are 30 things YOU can do to help #FreeTheArctic30: greenpeace.org/canada/en/Blog... ... RT @GreenpeaceCA." In this tweet, the protestor shared an article from Greenpeace website providing the ideas of 30 online and offline activities that movement participants can do to help the Arctic 30. Another example was: "The UN report contains hundreds of pages of evidence to justify the action of the brave Arctic 30. act.gp/164Dyda #FreeTheArctic30" produced by Twitter user "Sofia von Post". In this tweet, the protestor shared an article named *Free the Arctic 30, and lock up fossil fuels* from Greenpeace's

website articulating the UN report on the status of the world's climate in order to argue that the action of 30 Greenpeace activists against Gazprom was justified.

Content from organization websites was usually strongly supportive of the campaign and its activists. Movement participants circulated the content from organization websites, on one hand, to supplement more detailed information about the event for the general public (Stoddart & MacDonald, 2011; Stoddart et al., 2015). On the other hand, they intended to promote the solution of the issue with strong and inspiring arguments made by organizations (Stoddart & MacDonald, 2011; Stoddart et al., 2015). This is a consistent finding that is also shown in the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign.

Regarding the links to online news institutions, 17.60% of the examined tweets were linked to news media. Specifically, *The Guardian* website was the most commonly shared by activists, which accounted for 17.69% of the total link sharing to online news institutions. Twitter content linked to BBC website constituted 11.92% of all the link sharing to news media. Link sharing to *The Huffington Post* website represented 5%. Other news media websites that were shared on Twitter include *The New York Times*, Reuters, *The Independent*, *Sky News*, ABC, CBC, CNN, *China Daily*, *Los Angeles Times*, *The Times* and *The Washington Post*. As with the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign, articles created by *The Guardian* website were the most commonly circulated compared to other mass media.

Most articles from mass media websites were shared when Twitter users intended to pressure the Russian government to release the Arctic 30 and justify the action of 30 Greenpeace activists against Gazprom. The mass media articles informed the audiences of the online and offline support given by supporters and updated the progress of how the Russian government was addressing the Arctic 30 case. For example, Twitter user “Mina*Bad Yoga Kitty☺” posted

the following: “#FreeTheArctic30 Sir Paul McCartney urges #Putin to leniency for #Greenpeace detainees [bbc.in/1ieQwtW](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-45811111) NB Nov 16 GLOBAL DAY OF ACTION.” This tweet shared an article from the BBC website that showed a letter written by Paul McCartney (who was a member of the rock band The Beatles) to Russia’s president Vladimir Putin. This letter called for the release of the 30 Greenpeace activists who were detained in Russia.

In addition to news articles reporting updated news about the Arctic 30 event, activists also shared opinion articles that were published to comment on the arrest of 30 Greenpeace activists. For instance, Twitter user “Ysbryd PPFOB” wrote, “Where's the support for the jailed Artic 30 activist Colin Russell? | Andrew Wilkie [gu.com/p/3k3xp/tw](https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/nov/16/colin-russell-arrested) via @guardian #FreeTheArctic30.” This tweet called for support for one of the Arctic 30, Colin Russell, and the article from *The Guardian* appealed to the Australian government to help release this activist and articulated the reason why the government should protect its citizens. Media articles shared on Twitter by movement supporters were aligned with the content of tweets where the links were shared. Mass media articles were commonly shared when the authors describe more detailed information about the progress of the campaign or present similar opinions as movement support in their tweets. It seems that mass media content was circulated by social movement actors to support the veracity of Twitter messages or to enhance the perspectives of Twitter users against protest targets.

As with the analysis of the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign, my findings in the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign also indicate that mass media is used as a representative of authority to authenticate movement information and influence public opinions (Mattoni, 2012; Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Iyengar, 1991). This may be attributed to the capacity of media frames that can apply a structural logic to promote interpretation, evaluation and solutions

(Entman, 2004; Rivenburgh, 2013). Moreover, protestors are inclined to cite mass media articles sympathetic to movements in order to justify the rationality of movements because these articles contribute positive media coverage or opinions that legitimate activists' perspectives or criticize the attitudes of governments or stakeholders (Papaioannou, 2015). In the "Free the Arctic 30" campaign, social movement actors attempted to leverage mainstream mass media discourses to influence how audiences perceived the "Free the Arctic 30" campaign.

With reference to linking to other social media, 15.71% of the examined Twitter content had links to other social media platforms. Of these links, 28.02% were connected to YouTube, 16.38% were directed to Facebook, 9.48% were directed to Instagram, 8.62% were associated with Tumblr, 7.33% were connected to Flickr, 4.74% were directed to other Twitter posts, and 1.29% of them were connected to Vimeo.

My data shows that image and video-sharing websites were the most widely shared by social movement actors. As with the "Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership" campaign, sharing visual materials from other social media platforms provides social movement actors with more autonomy and diverse resources, such as audio, visual and written materials, to frame their messages (Staggenborg & Ramos, 2016). In addition, these platforms had a variety of pictures and video clips that presented extra information about the campaign, and many of these pictures and videos were not included on mass media websites and organizational websites. In other words, these resources from other social media platforms were produced by activists to bypass mass media and the control of governments and corporations (Earl & Kimport, 2011; Uldam & Askani, 2013; Castells, 2015; Ceron & Memoli, 2016). As such, the sharing of information from other social media platforms could provide audiences with unique insights that were different from mainstream voices.

My analysis of different types of link sharing shows that the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign made strategic use of a broader range of communication resources and operated within a more complex and multifaceted media environment that was facilitated by repertoires of communication (Mattoni, 2013). This is a consistent finding that is also suggested in the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign. Content created by authors on the website, such as online news articles and organizational articles, and user-generated content on different social media platforms, such as YouTube, Facebook and Instagram, converged on Twitter (Walther & Jang, 2012; Neubaum & Krämer, 2017). Specifically, my findings suggest that social media platforms are considered to be tools to show information with individual and self-configurable features that is not found on mainstream mass media or organizational websites. In addition, Twitter as a social media platform plays a role in converging information from different mass media and organizational sources, rather than offering the more detailed and comprehensive information that organizational websites and mass media websites are more proficient in. As such, the use of social media has not replaced mass media in contemporary social movements. Instead, a variety of communication channels are interconnected and coordinated in mobilization.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I examined the “Boycott Lego-Shell Partnership” and “Free the Arctic 30” critical events, which are part of the broader “Save the Arctic” campaign against Arctic oil development. The main themes of the collected Twitter content in both critical events can be seen from the table as below:

| | The “Boycott the Lego-Shell” Campaign | The “Free the Arctic 30” Campaign |
|---|--|---|
| 1 | Directly calling for a termination of Lego and Shell’s cooperation | Calling for help for the arrested 30 Greenpeace activists |
| 2 | Asking movement participants to take online and offline action to pressure Lego to stop its partnership with Shell | Online and offline support for the campaign |
| 3 | The visual use of Lego mini figures for protest | |

My findings show that while social media may allow individual participants to diffuse information to a broader audience, social movement organizations still play a vital role in initiating and structuring collective action within the social media field. Through my research, we gain further understanding of the changing relationship between social movement organizations and networked individuals in digital activism facilitated by social media.

My findings also suggest that a hybrid protest space consisting of digital social networks and offline support communities is established to assemble and recruit campaign adherents to take action (Castells, 2015). As another protest strategy, moral shocks are commonly used as emotional leverage to help movement supporters express outrage and transform emotion into action (Castells, 2015). The emotion of moral shocks is widely disseminated via visual communication on Twitter. Images are used as symbols and metaphors to gain visibility for the campaigns, shape public image of protest activities, and persuade the audiences to engage in the campaigns (Lyer & Oldmeadow, 2006; Joffe, 2008; O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009; Anne DiFrancesco & Young, 2011; Doerr et al., 2013). Furthermore, while the original model of the boomerang effect suggested that social movements in the Global South sought international

allies from the Global North to bring pressure on their domestic governments from outside, my research argues that the boomerang effect is no longer used only to generate international pressure in support of social movements primarily in the Global South (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Stoddart et al., 2016). As such, my study contributes to understanding of how protest tactics shift through social media activism.

Finally, my findings argue that social media does not wholly replace the importance of mass media coverage for social movements, but they help create a more complex and multifaceted media landscape for movements to navigate and make use of, which is consistent with the notion that social movements rely on increasingly broad repertoires of communication (Mattoni, 2012, 2013). My findings contribute insights into how the role of media environment in shaping public image of protests changes in the era of social media.

Chapter Five: Discussion and Conclusion

Throughout my thesis, I applied the literature on social movement and digital media to examine the changing relationship between social movement organizations and networked individuals in the “Boycott Lego-Shell Partnership” and “Free the Arctic 30” critical events in the “Save the Arctic” campaign. I used concepts like frame alignment processes, the boomerang effect, e-tactics, and visual communication to investigate how protest strategies shift through social media activism. I engaged the notion of repertoires of communication with my analysis of changing media environments for social movements. In this final chapter, I discuss my findings in terms of the similarities and differences in the mobilization of two critical events and stress the significance of my research. Then, I outline the limitations of my research project. Finally, I propose recommendations for future research.

Discussion of Findings

Social media presents environmental movements with both opportunities and challenges. Through examining the “Save the Arctic” campaign, I provide insights into the dynamics of environmental movements in contemporary societies. I summarize and compare the findings from the “Boycott Lego-Shell Partnership” and “Free the Arctic 30” events that I have discussed in the previous chapters in order to answer my research questions:

1. Who played a role in mobilizing the “Save the Arctic” campaign on Twitter?
2. What kind of discourses were produced to respond to the oil conflict on Twitter during the “Save the Arctic” campaign, and how did the Twitter content frame the campaign?
3. How was Twitter used by activists to extend and promote campaign-related messages in the “Save the Arctic” campaign?

My findings show that social movement information is widely proliferated by individuals with the aid of social media, such as Twitter, but the messages generated by social movement organizations resonate more with activists and receive more endorsement from them than content produced by individuals. My finding indicates that social media offers individuals more autonomy to express themselves publicly and enlarge the scope of engagement in contemporary social movements compared to traditional movements. However, social movement organizations still play a key role in the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign and the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign (Earl & Kimport, 2011). Despite claims about the waning influence of social movement organizations (Earl & Schussman, 2003; Shirky, 2008; Earl & Kimport, 2011; Castells, 2015) and the increasing importance of networked individualist forms of activism (Castells, 2015; Kleinhans, Van Ham & Evans-Cowley, 2015), my study shows that social movement organizations remain significant as diffusers of information and frames and organizers of collective action in social movements. In other words, social media may allow individual participants to diffuse information to a broader audience, but social movement organizations still play a vital role in initiating and structuring collective action within the social media field. Social movement organizations and networked individuals have become interconnected and coordinated to mobilize with the aid of social media. Through my research, we gain further understanding of the changing relationship between social movement organizations and networked individuals in digital activism facilitated by social media.

In terms of the relationship of different organizations in the two campaigns, my findings show that the mobilization of issues related to Arctic oil drilling relied on a coordination of multiple groups, rather than a single organization. In other words, the mesomobilization of different social movement organizations plays a vital role in enlarging the movement scope and

recruiting potential supporters (Gerhards & Rucht, 1992; Earl & Kimport, 2011). In both campaigns, Twitter was used to facilitate the process of mesomobilization by enabling social movement organizations to connect and communicate with each other more easily and reach a broader public (Rainie & Wellman, 2012; Browning, 2013). This is perhaps because social media allows movement organizations to collaborate with one another in order to achieve a larger movement than any single group can generate through the process of mesomobilization (Bennett, 2003a, 2003b, 2004a, 2004b; Earl & Kimport, 2011). As such, the coordination of different movement organizations is indispensable for social movements in the social media era. In addition, the two campaigns relied on a coalition of many regional branches rather than any single office. Concerning the relationship of various branches within Greenpeace, regional organizations localized the international issue of Arctic oil drilling in the campaign by disseminating information in the native languages of local citizens and organizing protest activities in local communities. This suggests that Greenpeace tries to promote the resonance of their protest messages with international audiences in ways that address linguistic and cultural barriers in transnational environmental movements because campaign frames might be perceived differently by different audiences based on their cultural backgrounds (Dauvergne & Neville, 2011). My findings explore the implication of the mesomobilization by social movement organizations. It is not only about the scope of coalition of different movement organizations, but also about the ability to understand various cultural contexts in which individual activists are embedded.

In order to align individuals' discursive activities and recruit potential supporters to engage in the campaigns, social movement organizations employed frame alignment processes as core tasks to depict problematic situations and propose relevant action on Twitter in both the

“Boycott Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign and the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign (Snow et al., 1986). Framing strategies that were used in these two campaigns appeared to be interconnected but also independent. As the first step of framing, social movement organizations in the “Boycott Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign identified on Twitter the problematic partnership of Lego and Shell that was considered to be devastating to the Arctic and attributed the blame to Lego and Shell (Benford & Snow, 2000). In the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign, the core issue determined by social movement organizations on Twitter was that the Russian government arrested and detained 30 Arctic Sunrise activists for protesting against the oil giant Gazprom. The Russian authorities were identified as the target to blame in this campaign. Next, the solutions and plans of action were proposed for the issues (Benford & Snow, 2000). As the solution for the Lego-Shell partnership, social movement organizations pressured Lego to end their partnership with Shell. In terms of the dilemma of the 30 Arctic Sunrise activists, social movement organizations pressured the Russian authorities to release the Arctic 30.

In order to promote solutions for these issues, a variety of e-tactics were employed through Twitter as the process of frame bridging alignment to assemble and recruit campaign adherents to take action (Snow et al., 1986; Earl & Kimport, 2011). On one hand, social movement actors encouraged audience members to participate in online and/or offline action. On the other hand, they showed support coming from online and offline protest activities on Twitter. In both campaigns, online action consists of a step on a ladder of engagement to foster subsequent offline action (Schumann & Klein, 2015) because low-threshold online participation creates an autonomous space for protestors to plan out their offline protest strategies (Castells, 2015), and showing activists’ support online could also boost a sense of empowerment and engagement (Nip, 2004; Drury et al., 2005; Hara, 2008; Wojcieszak, 2009). Despite the critical

voices questioning the effectiveness of online tactics (Bromberg, 2013; Lim, 2013), online tactics are still widely used by activists as important methods to engage in the campaigns. The analysis of two critical moments in the “Save the Arctic” campaign suggests that contemporary movements do not simply rely on online action or activities in offline spaces. Rather, it is a hybrid protest space consisting of digital social networks and offline support communities that lies at the centre of environmental movements in the social media age (Castells, 2015). Therefore, it could be helpful for activists to make strategic use of both online and offline activities if they expect to mobilize more supporters to engage in social movements.

As one strategy to facilitate the solution of issues, celebrities were mobilized by activists to support the campaigns. This finding suggests that celebrities are appointed a prominent role in mobilization around environmental issues. The important role of celebrities is also demonstrated in previous research literature (Brockington, 2008; Brockington, 2009; Tsaliki, Frangonikolopoulos & Huliaras, 2011). Calling on celebrities to help mobilize can increase the exposure for environmental issues, raise public awareness, direct media attention on the issues, and justify the rationality of the movements (Rohlinger, 2002; Brockington, 2009; Tsaliki, Frangonikolopoulos & Huliaras, 2011). On the other hand, celebrities can also rely on conversation to construct their celebrity (Brockington, 2008). Their involvement in supporting environmental causes is leveraged to develop their entertainment career (Brockington, 2008; Tsaliki, Frangonikolopoulos & Huliaras, 2011). According to the written and visual content I collected on Twitter, many celebrities participated in either online or offline activities. Because social media can easily expose celebrities’ personalities and make it possible for audiences to directly access celebrities (Ellcessor, 2012), how celebrities decide to get involved in social movements on social media directly impacts their fame and popularity. Therefore, it is also likely

for celebrities to seek cooperation with Greenpeace by offering to engage in the campaigns in order to increase their exposure on social media.

As another strategy to help address the issue, activists asked international political actors to take action in the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign. Movement supporters mobilized political forces from Brazil, India, South Africa, Australia, UK, Canada and other countries on Twitter to compel Russian authorities to release the Arctic 30. This strategy is described as the “boomerang effect” by Keck and Sikkink (1998). However, the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign showed an evolution of the boomerang effect in the era of digital activism. In traditional social movements, the boomerang effect was used by social movements in the Global South to seek international allies from the Global North in order to exert pressure on domestic governments in the Global South (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Stoddart et al., 2016). However, the boomerang effect is no longer used only to generate international pressure in support of social movements primarily in the Global South (Stoddart et al., 2016). Social media, such as Twitter, helps the boomerang pattern of influence characteristic of transnational networks evolve from this vertical pattern into a more horizontal form. This strategy is now also used by transnational movements to seek international allies from both northern and southern arenas to try to bring pressure on governments in the Global North. Social media provides activists across the globe with access to politicians through their official social media accounts, which makes it simpler and faster for domestic social movement actors to bypass their state and search out international allies. Meanwhile, the threats of climate change to the Arctic have been reconfigured as matters of global concern, prompting transnational activists to participate in Arctic-related activities. My research contributes insights into how the dynamics of the boomerang effect is shifting through social media activism.

As the last step of shaping the discourses about the two campaigns on Twitter (Benford & Snow, 2000), social movement organizations produced an appealing and convincing rationale to justify their action. This motivational rationale was constructed in order to transform individuals' emotion to action. In order to achieve this transformation, social movement actors are required to incite anger and outrage because it is the key to overcoming anxiety and creating hope to pursue their goals (Castells, 2015). In the "Boycott Lego-Shell Partnership" campaign, activists tried to justify their protest action through political consumerism, which combines morality and the market (Holzer, 2010). By framing the partnership of Lego and Shell as a negative impact on children, activists expected to change shopping decisions of parents who were the main consumers of Lego products and used them to protest Lego and Shell. In both campaigns, activists sent direct condemnation from a variety of parties to the targets that were responsible for the conflicts as ways to express their grievances and outrage. In addition, both campaigns widely circulated discourses of environmental disruption caused by Arctic oil drilling, especially the threat to polar bears. The cruel living condition of polar bears was frequently depicted in striking pictures and these images enabled social movement organizations to draw public attention and trigger their moral commitment to take action (Anne DiFrancesco & Young, 2011).

However, the reliance on polar bear politics as a framework for communicating about climate change shifts attention away from human communities in the north. This is a critique that was argued in previous research (Wright, 2014; Callison, 2014; Martinez, 2014). Indigenous people are also affected by the consequences of climate change, such as more intense storms, the loss of wildlife habitat, and the loss and excess of water (Callison, 2014; Martinez, 2014). While polar bears are frequently highlighted as the victims of climate change in social movements, the devastating impact of climate change on Inuit and Alaska Native cultures is neglected. The issue

of climate change is not only about environmental challenges, but it is also about the colonization of northern communities (e.g. land and resources) and cultures, and a matter of sovereignty and human rights (Martinez, 2014; Wright, 2014; Shadian, 2014).

In a nutshell, my research explores how emotion is mobilized on social networking platforms to encourage individuals to engage in social movements. The proliferation of social media platforms provides individuals with more autonomy and flexibility to share their feelings with others and also enables their voices to reach a broader public through their networks on social media. My findings reveal that the significant role of both outrage and hope as emotional resources that initialize social movements has not changed. However, what has changed is that the tools social movement actors use to mobilize outrage and hope have become extended and enhanced.

My study provides insights into how visual communication is used as part of social movement framing in digital forms of mobilization. Visual analysis of protest practices should be integrated with text-based approaches to analysis to better understand transnational environmental contention because visual communication plays a vital role in framing environmental issues and disseminating information in environmental movements. Thanks to the participatory and interactive features of social media, pictures and videos can be uploaded online in real time by activists to diffuse information about protests through visual narratives. These visual materials documenting protest in offline spaces provide the opportunity for audiences to access authentic protest messages online. Visual markers like symbols assist individuals in identifying the orientation of a group and whether or not they belong to a protest as allies (Doerr et al., 2013). These visual materials are virally disseminated by social media users to reach a broad audience beyond the social movement scene, and thus they are able to shape public images

of protests and help construct collective identities (Doerr et al., 2013). In other words, visual communication is able to produce the power of persuasion and mobilization because images can easily communicate metaphor and rearticulate reality (Lyer & Oldmeadow, 2006; Joffe, 2008; O'Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009; Anne DiFrancesco & Young, 2011).

By looking at link sharing, my study suggests that social media is not only seen as an opportunity for protest actors to create their own frames to shape conflicts, but they are also perceived as platforms for social movement actors to enhance the influence of their information. In both events of the “Save the Arctic” campaign, activists commonly shared online campaign websites, mass media websites, organizational websites and other social networking websites in their Twitter posts. By doing so, protestors expected to gain more public visibility for the issues, to provide more detailed information, and to engage a broader public in action through Twitter. In other words, Twitter as a social media platform plays a role in converging information from mass media and organizations, rather than offering detailed and comprehensive information that organizational and mass media websites are more proficient in. In comparing mainstream mass media and organizational websites, Twitter is more effective for sharing information with individual and self-configurable features that are not usually seen on mainstream mass media or organizational websites.

The development of information and communication technologies has transformed the mainstream-dominated media system into a complex and multifaceted media environment that is facilitated by repertoires of communication (Mattoni, 2012, 2013). In other words, the Internet and social networking platforms have challenged the monopoly of traditional mass media over the representation of social movements. The role of shaping public image of protests has shifted from mainstream mass media to a more complex and multifaceted media platform consisting of

mass media and social media. What I want to stress here is that mass media still functions as crucial platforms for social movement actors to accomplish their mobilization goals and they have not been replaced by social media. Rather, social media helps create a more complex and multifaceted media landscape that is more diverse than before for movements to navigate and make use of (Mattoni, 2012, 2013). My study contributes insights into the interconnection of social media and traditional mainstream media. These repertoires of communication require social movement actors to learn to make strategic use of a broader range of communication tools.

Finally, while social media empowers individuals with more autonomy to mobilize around environmental issues, they also allow the perspectives of counter-movement actors to become more visible and easier to access. The analysis of the “Save the Arctic” campaign shows that some people did not support Greenpeace’s campaign or held a questioning attitude towards the effectiveness of social media in mobilization around environmental issues. As shown in my data, Greenpeace was also criticized for its extreme protest action. For some audience members, low-risk online tactics, such as tweeting or emailing, were considered to be inefficient in terms of bringing about measurable social changes. This finding suggests that the capacity of online activism for producing substantial changes is still under discussion and needs additional investigation and evaluation. These findings imply that campaign frames and strategies in the “Save the Arctic” campaign were not fully embraced by audiences and may be critiqued by some Twitter users. In other words, social media can easily expose counter-movement opinions and challenge social movements.

Limitations

One of the limitations of my research design is the size of the sample. This limitation resides in three aspects. First, I only chose to examine the “Save the Arctic” campaign. The adverse impact of oil exploitation and consumption on the climate and environment is a critical issue that has been widely discussed in recent years. The “Save the Arctic” campaign was an influential environmental movement mobilized in both offline and cyber spaces to protect the Arctic from oil drilling, and it also received a large response from global audiences online and offline. Therefore, the “Save the Arctic” campaign is a representative case to explore how contemporary environmental movements unfold in the social media age. Despite its uniqueness, it can only contribute limited insights into the dynamics of environmental movements in the era of social media. For instance, my research project lacks insights into how environmental movements mobilize around the negative impact of climate change on human communities in the Arctic on social media platforms. In addition, I was not able to analyze how other conflicts related to oil exploration and climate change were mobilized and how other types of environmental issues were mobilized in digital activism. Therefore, my study might not present a comprehensive and integrated picture of environmental activism against oil development in the social media era, and it is likely that not all my research findings can be applied to explain movements targeting other environmental issues.

Second, my research only focuses on Twitter. During the process of data collection and analysis, I found that Twitter presented a discussion of oil conflict in the Arctic from diverse sources, such as individual activists, social movement organizations, politicians, and celebrities, and relevant content was presented using a variety of tactics, such as textual communication, visual communication and link sharing. I realized the complexity of the Twitter content enabled me to explore the “Save the Arctic” campaign at a more comprehensive level. However, limited

research time did not allow me to fully examine other social networking platforms, such as Facebook, YouTube, Flickr, or Instagram. Social movement actors might have different strategies to employ on different social media based on the advantages of their platform features. Thus, I could miss characteristics of the “Save the Arctic” campaign on other social media platforms.

Another limitation of my research design is the sampling strategy for the “Save the Arctic” campaign. The “Save the Arctic” campaign rose in 2012 and subsided in 2015, and the main stage of the campaign lasted 5 years. While I was searching the relevant data to this campaign, I found there were tens of thousands of tweets on Twitter which were related to the discussion. Due to time constraints, I needed to narrow the scope of my research data and tease out the most valuable and relevant data to answer my research questions. Thus, I decided to locate a few key words/hashtags which could construct a feasible sample size for examining the “Save the Arctic” campaign. This sampling strategy eventually helped me locate two critical moments in the “Save the Arctic” campaign which are the “Boycott Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign and the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign. This sampling strategy only allowed me to explore two critical events that were most typical of the “Save the Arctic” campaign, but there were other smaller scale events or less typical moments during the campaign that were missing from my case study. Therefore, the dynamics of the “Save the Arctic” campaign shown in my analysis was perhaps less diverse than in actuality. Besides, I analyzed a 10% sample of the “Free the Arctic 30” campaign when I was examining this event. I was aware that a 10% sample was not an ideal sample size, but it made sense in terms of constructing a corpus of data that was feasible given available resources.

Other methodological limitations include the barriers of textual analysis. The textual data I gathered for my research was already generated on Twitter before I started my study, but the interpretation I contributed to the data was directed by my knowledge in sociological fields and my cultural backgrounds. In other words, my understandings of the data were not equal to the actual viewpoints and explanations that social movement actors had for the “Save the Arctic” campaign. This is also known as the problem of inference in textual analysis (Cottle, 2003). This means textual analysis only allowed me to provide insights into the campaign based on my own research standpoint, and I might not have an accurate grasp of all the data that I examined by only using textual analysis.

Recommendation for Future Research

Based on my research findings, some additional research could be conducted to gain a deeper insight into the interaction of social media and social movements. The first area that would be worthwhile to examine is how social movement actors actually planned to use social media to mobilize the “Save the Arctic” campaign versus how I interpreted this from my data. One of the limitations of my study is that the meaning of textual content that I interpreted may not be aligned with the intention of content producers. This concern can be addressed through interviewing because it helps researchers explore complicated phenomena that may be hidden or unseen and gain insights into the perspectives of social movement actors who were directly involved in the “Save the Arctic” campaign (Tracy, 2012). As such, it would be useful to conduct interviews with organizational leaders and individual protestors because content producers would be able to offer more critical insights into the “Save the Arctic” campaign and the social dynamics of content production and reception.

The second recommendation for future research is exploring how the targets of conflicts respond to social movements. Throughout my research, I examined a variety of supportive responses to Arctic oil conflict from social movement organizations, individual participants, celebrities and international politicians, and also examined how social media was employed by movement supporters to mobilize around social issues. However, the viewpoints from the oil industry and governments as mobilization targets were not obvious on Twitter based on my sample and keyword search strategies. The role of social media in mobilizing the perspectives of these stakeholders remained unknown. Thus, it would be useful for future research to look into how the mobilization targets considered the role of social media in response to Arctic oil conflict or other environmental issues and how environmental movement opponents used social media to respond to challenges. Research in these questions could present a contrast between the social media use of movement supporters and movement targets and also provide a more critical understanding of the influence of social media in digital activism.

Another recommendation is for a broader study of social movements and digital media. Future research should consider how other factors potentially influence the role of social media in mobilizing social movements. My research findings about the role of social media in mobilizing environmental movements can be used as a general reference to explain other environmental activities mobilized with the aid of social media. However, there are other elements I did not have an opportunity to examine that may also affect social media uses, such as the impact of governmental policies on social media, the competences for social media that users have, the activity funding of an organization, and the role of astroturfing activities in shaping social media as a dispersed space of social movement mobilization. These elements would affect how accessible social media is to audiences, how proficient activists are in social media uses,

and the authenticity of digitally networked individualism. Any of these elements is likely to affect how social media plays a role in different social movements in different regions.

Therefore, exploring how other resources interconnect with social media in a movement would help us better understand the opportunities and challenges of digital activism is facing in contemporary societies.

Finally, I recommend that researchers continue to pay attention to social media activism in the future and further explore what barriers, if any, currently hinder people from mobilizing around social issues on social media platforms. For example, future research can investigate what may impede Greenpeace to draw attention to the impact of climate change on northern communities on Twitter in the “Boycott the Lego-Shell Partnership” campaign and “Free the Arctic 30” campaign. I have discussed the deficiency of online protest action that is proposed by some scholars (Lim, 2013; Bromberg, 2013; Schumann & Klein, 2015), but it is difficult to evaluate this perspective without further investigation and research. This perspective can be better evaluated through conducting further research by looking at more cases of digital activism and optimizing the research methods, such as adding fieldwork and interviews as part of the research methodologies. This could help social movement actors gain a better understanding of the negative effects of social media, such as the surveillance and control of dissent, as well as tendencies towards clicktivism, and improve their protest tactics in order to better face these challenges.

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Appendix One

Coding categories for the “Save the Arctic” campaign

➤ Content Producers

- 350 Australia
- ABC the Drum
- Action Aid
- Alaska Wilderness League
- Arctic Sunrise
- Clean Ocean Energy
- Climate Issues
- Climate Reality
- EcoWatch
- Friends of the Earth
- GP Activist Network
- GP Arctic Watch
- GP Rainbow Warrior
- GP Volunteering Lab
- Greenpeace

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| • Greenpeace Africa |
| • Greenpeace Andalucia |
| • Greenpeace Aus Pac |
| • Greenpeace Belgium |
| • Greenpeace Bristol |
| • Greenpeace Camden |
| • Greenpeace Canada |
| • Greenpeace Canterbury |
| • Greenpeace Cherbourg |
| • Greenpeace Czech |
| • Greenpeace Dusseldorf |
| • Greenpeace East Asia |
| • Greenpeace Edinburgh |
| • Greenpeace EU |
| • Greenpeace Euskadi |
| • Greenpeace France |
| • Greenpeace Germany |
| • Greenpeace Hannover |

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| • Greenpeace Huddersfield |
| • Greenpeace Illes Balears |
| • Greenpeace India |
| • Greenpeace Japan |
| • Greenpeace Korea |
| • Greenpeace Leeds |
| • Greenpeace Napoli |
| • Greenpeace Newcastle |
| • Greenpeace Niederrh |
| • Greenpeace NL |
| • Greenpeace Notts |
| • Greenpeace NZ |
| • Greenpeace Oxford |
| • Greenpeace Pacific Northwest |
| • Greenpeace Philippines |
| • Greenpeace Pictures |
| • Greenpeace Pix |
| • Greenpeace Portsmouth |

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| • Greenpeace PressDesk |
| • Greenpeace Quebec |
| • Greenpeace Reunion |
| • Greenpeace Russia |
| • Greenpeace Shoreditch |
| • Greenpeace Slovensko |
| • Greenpeace Southeast Asia |
| • Greenpeace Southwark (SE London) |
| • Greenpeace Southwest London |
| • Greenpeace St. Olaf |
| • Greenpeace Starsbourg |
| • Greenpeace Suomi |
| • Greenpeace Sverige |
| • Greenpeace Switzerland |
| • Greenpeace UK |
| • Greenpeace UK Oceans |
| • Greenpeace USA |
| • Greenpeace Vancouver |

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| • Greenpeace Vaud |
| • Greenpeace Waltham Forest (East London) |
| • HHS Earth Club |
| • Imperiled Oceans |
| • Local Auckland |
| • Lucy Lawless Fan Club Team |
| • March for Elephants |
| • Mid island News |
| • MintPress News |
| • Nature for Life Conservation Initiative |
| • Protect All Wildlife |
| • Save The Arctic |
| • Scottish Young Greens |
| • Sea Shepherd Balt DC |
| • Team4Nature UK |
| • the Public Society |
| • Wilderness Committee |
| • WWF |

- WWF Australia

- WWF EU

- WWF New Zealand

- WWF Scotland

- WWF UK

➤ Content Targets

- Celebrities

- Lego

- Media

- BBC News

- Russian News Media

- YouTube

- Others

- Oil Drilling Industry

- Gazprom

- Shell

- Others

- Online Action

- Organizations

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| ○ Arctic Sunrise |
| ○ Do the Green Thing |
| ○ Greenpeace |
| ○ Greenpeace UK |
| • Others |
| • The Authorities |
| ○ The American Authorities |
| ○ The Australian Politicians |
| ○ The Brazilian Politicians |
| ○ The Canadian Authorities |
| ○ The Indian Politicians |
| ○ The Italian Politicians |
| ○ The New Zealand Politicians |
| ○ The Russian Authorities |
| ○ The South African Politicians |
| ○ The European Court of Human Rights |
| ○ The UK Authorities |
| ○ The UN |

➤ **Text Content Themes**

- a large number of people are engaging in online action
- ask Lego to stop its partnership with Shell
- ask politicians from other countries to help release the arctic 30
- ask Russia to drop piracy charges
- ask Russia to release the Arctic 30
- ask audiences to take action to support the campaign
 - ask people to participate in offline action
 - ask people to engage in online action
- ask to protect the Arctic's environment
- boycott the oil industry
 - oil pollution is disastrous
 - Shell damages the Arctic (environment)
- call on celebrities to support
- call on Gazprom company to free the arctic 30
- call on media to support
- call on Shell to help free the arctic 30
- cite words from influential people as support
- climate change has increased the Arctic ocean's temperature and the ice's melting speed

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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • compliment activists' action |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • compliment Lego |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • compliment online action |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • concerns about the Arctic |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • condemn the Russian government for using power illegally |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • criticize Greenpeace's campaign |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • criticize online action |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • dissatisfaction with no action from Canadian authorities for the arrested Canadian activists |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • dissatisfaction with no action from the UK authorities for the arrested British activists |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • dissatisfaction with UN climate change conference |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • do not support the winter Olympics held by Russia |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • feel concerned about the Arctic 30 |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • feel happy for the released Arctic 30 |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • feel sad or heartbroken towards the Arctic 30 |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • feel sad towards the Lego-Shell partnership |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • grievances about the Lego's partnership with Shell |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • grievances and criticism about Russia's action on the Arctic 30 |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • individuals directly sending online support |

- Italian oil company Eni called on Gazprom to free the Arctic 30
- justified power cannot be stopped
- justify the Arctic 30's protest against oil drilling
- Lego is partnership with Shell
- Lego love to free the Arctic 30
- Lego matters to children
- Lego mini figures are used to protest
- Lego should support green resources
- Lego succeeded ending partnership with Shell
- letters from prison
- other news
- protest songs for the Arctic 30
- Russia refused to release the arctic 30
- Russian news media blocked the photos against the Arctic Sunrise activist
- Shell and Lego are polluting kids' imagination
- Shell uses Lego to clean up its image for dirty oil drilling
- shocking video about Russian special forces confronting Greenpeace activists
- stop buying Lego products

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|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • support from celebrities |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • support from environmental experts |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • support from human rights advisor |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • support from international authorities |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • support from International Law of Sea Tribunal (UN-mandated tribunal) |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • support from legal experts |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • support from media |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • support from Nobel Peace Laureates |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • support from organizations |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • support from Russian authorities |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • support from the Arctic 30's family |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • support from the Arctic 30's teammates |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • support to Lego |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • thank Lego for stopping the partnership |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • thanks from the Arctic 30 |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • thanks to individuals |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • thanks to influential people |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • thanks to organizations |

- thanks to other countries' politicians
- the Arctic 30 are captured and detained in Russia for peaceful protest
- the Arctic 30 are charged with piracy or hooliganism by Russia
- the Arctic 30 are released
- the Arctic 30 reunite with their family and friends
- the Arctic 30's hearings
- the Arctic 30's stories
- the Arctic is being threatened by the oil drilling related issues
- activists are taking offline action
- the tough situation of the arctic 30
- touching moments from the Arctic 30
- YouTube blocks Greenpeace's Lego video

➤ **Link Sharing**

- Academic Source Website
- Gazprom Website
- Governmental Websites
 - The Russian government website
 - The UK Parliament website

- Letter Writing Website

- Music Website

- News Sites

- ABC

- BBC

- Business Insider

- CBC

- China Daily

- CNN

- Forbes

- Global News

- Los Angeles Times

- others

- Reuters

- Sky News

- The Guardian

- The Huffington Post

- The Independent

- The New York Times

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| ○ The Times |
| ○ The Wall Street Journal |
| ○ The Washington Post |
| • Online Donation Websites |
| • Online Petition Websites |
| • Organization Websites |
| ○ 350 |
| ○ EcoWatch |
| ○ Greenpeace |
| ○ O Dia da Terra |
| ○ other organization webs |
| ○ WWF |
| • Personal Websites |
| • Search Engine (e.g. Google) |
| • Social Media Platforms |
| ○ Facebook |
| ○ Flickr |
| ○ Instagram |
| ○ Others |

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| ○ Tumblr |
| ○ Twitter |
| ○ Vimeo |
| ○ YouTube |
| • Tool websites (e.g. Twitter map, Google map or Twibbon) |

➤ Visual Communication

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| • Images |
| ○ #tweetspill poster |
| ○ #BlockShell poster |
| ○ #FreetheArctic30 badge |
| ○ #FreetheArctic30 poster - melted icebergs and broken ice |
| ○ #FreetheArctic30 poster - the Arctic Sunrise ship and a cow holding “Free the Arctic 30” board |
| ○ #FreetheArctic30 posters |
| ○ #FreetheArctic30 posters - a hand holding free the Arctic Sunrise ship out of the ocean |
| ○ #FreetheArctic30 posters- the Arctic 30's photos edited with encouraging words |
| ○ "#FreetheArctic30" made with Lego bricks |
| ○ a screenshot from news website |

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| ○ a screenshot of Russian Olympic Game official website |
| ○ a screenshot of the survey showing the majority thinks the Arctic 30 should be freed |
| ○ Arctic Sunrise ship is sailing in the ocean (with rainbow and different countries' flags) |
| ○ armed Russian Coast Guard officials |
| ○ birds standing on the isolated ice |
| ○ CCTV footage of six men breaking in Greenpeace office |
| ○ dogs wearing supporting words for the Arctic 30 |
| ○ drawing (handwriting) from kids or kids are drawing |
| ○ Gandhi monument or drawing |
| ○ Gazprom and Shell's CEOs |
| ○ information poster - a notice of the hearing by International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea |
| ○ information poster - supporting event |
| ○ Lego |
| ▪ a Lego mini figure is painting Shell's brand icon |
| ▪ a Lego polar bear is standing up and roaring |
| ▪ kids play Lego toys |

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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Lego mini figures (others) |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Lego mini figures - oil workers and polar bears get stuck in the oil spill |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Lego mini figures are celebrating |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Lego mini figures are protesting against Shell |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Lego toys with Shell's logo |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Lego's black bricks are getting close to the polar bear |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Lego's brochures with Shell's logo on |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ supporting poster - seals are sadly lying on broken ice (Lego bricks) |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Obama is holding free the arctic poster |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ offline protest - a pumpkin with free the Arctic slogan |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ offline protest - activists |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ offline protest - activists and life size polar bears |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ offline protest - activists protesting in the cage |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ offline protest - climbing the Eiffel tower or buildings |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ offline protest - holding “happy birthday” poster to the Arctic 30 activists |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ offline protest - information booth |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ offline protest - kids are protesting |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ offline protest - oil spill and Lego theme park |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ offline protest - protest for the Arctic 30 with candles |

- offline protest - protest poster against Gazprom at the football game
- offline protest - protest setting with Greenpeace activists' protesting slogan
- offline protest - protestor and propaganda poster
- offline protest - protestors and live size Lego figures
- offline protest - protestors, life size polar bear, life size Lego
- offline protest - Russian flag is on Arctic Sunrise ship
- offline protest - supporting billboard
- offline protest - supporting live concert
- offline protest - supporting messages on stickers (bird and rainbow)
- oil drilling and dirty oil spill
- photo of many people going to Russian court
- photo of politicians calling to free the Arctic 30
- photo of the Guardian's newspaper article about the Arctic 30
- photos of the Arctic 30 protesting
- photos of the Arctic 30's thanking words
- Polar bear
 - #FreetheArctic30 poster - polar bear
 - a contrast of a safe environment for polar bears and an unsafe environment
 - a dead polar bear

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| ▪ a polar bear is clinging to the edge of a piece of ice |
| ▪ a polar bear is drowning |
| ▪ Aurora |
| ▪ inflatable polar bear dying next to the arctic sunrise ship |
| ▪ Lego campaign poster - polar bear |
| ▪ petition website with a polar bear standing on the broken ice |
| ▪ polar bear and seal are drowning in the oil spill |
| ▪ polar bear and Shell logo |
| ▪ polar bear holding Lego bricks and Shell's oil rig |
| ▪ polar bear is roaring to an oil rig |
| ▪ polar bear is standing on a Lego brick (analogy-broken ice) |
| ▪ Polar bears (“high five”) are celebrating |
| ▪ polar bears are standing on the isolated ice |
| ▪ polar bears on thin ice |
| ▪ the painting of a polar bear holding free the Arctic activists’ poster |
| ○ pop culture or celebrity |
| ○ postcard writing poster |
| ○ protesting songs for the Arctic 30 |
| ○ screenshots from Greenpeace's videos |

- a mini Lego figure is crying
- a unicorn
- oil is submerging the Arctic creatures
- screenshots of protesting content being clogged online
- sketch of the jail cell from the Arctic 30
- supporting poster - big fish (people) is chasing two small fish (Gazprom and Shell)
- supporting poster with photos of Nobel Peace Laureates
- supporting poster with written words
- others
- quote encouraging words spoken by the Arctic 30
- quote from Olympic legend John Carlos
- supporting words from Putin
- things you can do to support the arctic 30
- supporting posters for Lego campaign - Lego toys edited with supporting words
- supporting tattoos
- supporting writing for the Arctic 30
- the Arctic 30 protestor is handcuffed or in jail
- the Arctic broken ice

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|--|
| ○ the Arctic Sunrise ship and isolated ice with a heart made of different national flags |
| ○ the beauty of the Arctic |
| ▪ iceberg |
| ▪ Polar bear's love |
| ▪ snowy owl |
| ○ the photo of #FreetheArctic30 watch |
| ○ the photo of politicians from other countries |
| ○ the photo of sad moments of Arctic 30's family |
| ○ the photo of sunrise |
| ○ the photo of the Arctic 30 |
| ○ the photo of the arctic 30 being brought to the Investigative Committee |
| ○ the photo of the Arctic 30 reuniting with their family and friends |
| ○ the photo of the arctic 30 with arms raised when they were pointed with guns |
| ○ the photo of the Arctic Sunrise activists leaving with smiles or thumb up |
| ○ the relatives of the Arctic 30 holding supporting poster |
| • videos |
| ○ #freekieron |
| ○ #FreeTheArctic30 with Kumi Naidoo |

- "30 days of injustice" Global Day of Solidarity for the Arctic 30
- "everything is not awesome"
- “Arctic 30” Face 7 Years in Prison for Targeting Russian Gas Drilling
- 100 years of destruction
- 50 kids took some giant LEGO bricks to Shell’s offices
- @faizaoulahsen from @GreenPeace explains action of @gp_sunrise
#freethearctic30.
- Action de Greenpeace sur la Tour Eiffel
- An Arctic Adventure - Words Over Waltham Forest
- anonymous message to leaders of Russia operation green rights
- Arctic 30 Detainee Kieron Bryan reacts to news he has been granted bail
- Arctic 30 Letters from prison
- Arctic 30 members released on bail
- Arctic30 Solidarity Flash mob with Rickard Söderberg at the central station in Malmö
- Behind the scene with the Arctic 30 support team
- celebrities protest for the arctic 30
- Der sterbende Schwan by Greenpeace
- first Russians of the arctic 30 released on bail

- Free the Arctic 30 #Greenpeace
- from peaceful action to Russian prison
- Giant Lego people are protesting offline
- Greenpeace - Global Warming and Climate Change
- Greenpeace Promo Video
- Greenpeace update #FreeTheArctic30 with Kumi Naidoo
- inspiring action
- Lego and Shell in NZ...block by block
- Lego, help children save the arctic
- Libertad para los 30 activistas de Greenpeace detenidos en Rusia
- live concerts
- Masked men enter Greenpeace office grounds
- protest for the arctic 30
- Reversed graffiti street art action in solidarity with the arctic 30
- Russian special forces confronting Greenpeace activists on Gazprom Arctic oil rig
- Russian views on Greenpeace piracy charges
- save the arctic and free the arctic
- Save the Arctic from Shell and Gazprom

- Stand with the arctic 30
- Vicious Circle
- Суд над активистами Greenpeace в Мурманске

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